do justice to that learned judge; to confute his opponent; and to fupport the truth. Thus

"

"that one perception, or idea, is not another; that one man «is not another: and, when perceptions are thus diftin« guished on the first view, it is called felf evidence, or « intuitive knowledge.-There are fome other things, "whofe agreement, or difference, is not known on the ❝view; and then we compare them by the means of fome "third matter, by which we come to measure their agree"ment, difagreement, or relation.-As if the queftion be, "whether certain land be the land of J. S. or J. N. and "a record be produced, whereby the land appears to be « transferred from J. S. to J. N: Now, when we fhew ❝ any fuch third perception, and that doth neceffarily "infer the relation in question, this is called knowledge by « demonstration. The way of knowledge by neceffary in«ference is certainly the highest and clearest knowledge, "that mankind is capable of in his way of reasoning; and "therefore, always to be fought, when it may be had."Demonstration is generally conversant about permanent "things, which being constantly obvious to our senses, do "afford to them a very clear, and diftinct comparison : "But, tranfient things, that cannot always occur to our « fenfes, are generally more obfcure; because they have no « conftant being, but must be retrieved by memory, and "recollection.-Now, moft of the bufinefs of civil life "fubfifts on the actions of men, that are tranfient things; " and therefore oftentimes are not capable of strict demon"ftration, which, as I faid, is founded on the view of our "fenses; and therefore, the rights of men must be determined "by PROBABILITY.-Now, as all demonstration is founded "on the view of a man's own proper fenfes, by a gradation "of clear and diftinct perceptions; fo all PROBABILITY "is founded upon obfcure and indiftinct views, or upon

" report

Thus clear, and satisfactory is the Lord Chief Baron Gilbert, when his opinion is quoted, as it ought to be, with the context, which exhibits to the eye, and impreffes on the understanding, a very different train of reafoning

"report from the fight of others.-Now, this, in the first "place is very plain, that when we cannot hear, or fee, any "thing ourselves, and yet are obliged to make a judgment "of it, we must fee and hear by report from others; which "is one step further from demonstration, which is founded "upon the view of our fenfes; and yet, there is that faith "and credit to be given to the honefty and integrity of "credible and difinterested witnesses, attefting any fact "under the folemnities and obligations of religion, and the dangers and penalties of perjury, that the mind equally acquiefces therein, as on a knowledge by demonftration: "For, it cannot have any more reafon to be doubted than if "we ourselves had heard and feen it: And this is the original "of trials, and all manner of evidence.-The firft, "therefore, and most signal rule, in relation to evidence, "is this, that a man must have the utmoft evidence, the "nature of the fact is capable of: For, the defign of the "law is to come to rigid demonftration in matters of right, " and there can be no demonstration of a fact, without the "best evidence, that the nature of the thing is capable of: "Lefs evidence doth but create opinion and furmise, and « does not leave a man the entire fatisfaction, that arises "from demonstration: For, if it be plainly feen in the na"ture of a tranfaction, that there is fome more evidence, "that doth not appear, the very not producing it is a pre"fumption that it would have detested fomething more "than appears already; and therefore the mind does not "acquiefce in any thing lower than the utmoft evidence, "that the fact is capable of."

with scientific skill; fhunning the Charybdis of credulity, on the one quarter, and the Scylla of fufpicion, on the other.

To the inquifitive fearchers after truth, the great object of their voyage, there were produced title-deeds; written affurances, and receipts; letters of royal, and noble, personages; fignatures, and writings, of Shakspeare; and, with other documents, engravings of dramatic characters. In order to fatisfy themselves of the authenticity of thofe Shakspeariana, they applied to them, in forming their judgments, the fame rules of evidence, which direct the affairs of life; which govern in the diftribution of justice; which comfort in the momentous concerns of religion. In these interesting objects, mankind act only on calculations of probability; disregarding possibilities. From the never-failing recurrence of the seasons, men naturally expect the usual fucceffion of the spring to the winter, of fummer to the fpring, of autumn to the fummer, and of winter to the autumn, attended with their happy effects, in the accustomed order: Hence, mankind reasonably expect, that the events, which usually happen, will probably happen again: And, as recent difcoveries had fhewn, that fragments of Shakspeare, having lately been found, were likely again to be met with,

in the course of refearch; the inquirers after truth logically inferred, that they had difcovered, in those Shakspeariana, the objects of their fearch; believing, with Beattie, "that things are, as our fenfes represent them” (i).

66

On these principles of common fense, which induce us, in matters of evidence, to trust to our hearing, feeing, touching, tafting, and fmelling, men, women, and children, act in "daily life;" regarding probability; and difregarding poffibility, Never was any man prevented from buying a houfe; because it was objected, that it would, poffibly, fall; knowing, from the view thereof, that it would, probably, ftand, during the intended period of its duration. Never was any woman ftopped from gadding, in queft of pleasure, by an objection of the poffibility of meeting with misfortune; because the inferred, from the ready calculation of probabilities, that, having always returned fafe from fimilar excurfions, she should again return, without meeting with misfortune. Never was any child hindered from play, by warnings of danger; because he knew, from the probabilities of his boyish experience, that having often played, without harm, there was but little probability of harm. (i) Effay on Truth, 63.

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ing from the wild pofition of Mr. Malone, which evaporates, when truth appears with "the facred radiance of the fun."

Mifapprehending thus, the chief Baron's, real fentiments, the public accufer would inculcate, that, when any new-found writings of a dead poet are offered to our view, nothing short of rigid demonfiration ought to fatisfy us of their real authenticity. But, he discovers little philofophy, and less candour, when he catches at an exaggerated expreffion of the learned judge, which cannot be dewho fended in its whole extent. Every one, has attended to the workings of his own mind, or listened to the voice of daily experience, must clearly perceive, that rigid demonstration can only be found in the higher fciences. The learned judge meant nothing more by his ftrong expreffion, as the context' fhows, than the higheft evidence, which the nature of different cafes can fairly afford. The evidence of the fenfes, fubject as they are to error, from natural imperfections, do not furnish demonftrations of a fact (1): The

(1) We all remember the occurrence of a late ferjeant at law, who, though he certainly knew the rules of evidence, was yet fadly miftaken in fuppofing, that the fenfes furnish demonftration, with regard to the identity of a robber.

evidence

2