the Creation: but many who admit these proofs still doubt the continued superintendence of that intelligence, maintaining that the system of the universe is carried on by the force of the laws originally impressed on matter, without the necessity of fresh interference or continued supervision on the part of the Creator. Such an opinion is indeed founded only on a verbal fallacy; for "laws impressed on matter" is an expression, which can only denote the continued exertion of the will of the Lawgiver, the prime Agent, the first Mover: still however the opinion has been entertained; and perhaps it no where meets with a more direct and palpable refutation, than is afforded by the subserviency of the present structure of the earth's surface to final causes; for that structure is evidently the result of many and violent convulsions subsequent to its original formation. When therefore we perceive that the secondary causes producing these convulsions have operated at successive periods, not blindly and at random, but with a direction to beneficial ends, we see at once the proofs of an overruling Intelligence continuing to superintend, direct, modify, and control the operations of the agents, which he originally ordained." pp. 18 sq.

Let us take an instance from the science, in which those secondary causes, and their effects, have been most appreciated-Physical Astronomy. It has been satisfactorily proved, that the selection of the law of force which sways the planetary motions is the best that could have been devised, introducing stability into the system by the exact compensation of the disturbances, which originate in the mutual actions of its masses. Yet who will venture to impugn, even in this case, the belief of a continued superintendence? May it not, for aught we know, be as necessary in the case of a ma

terial assemblage, subjected to a law of force, as in the case of one with no such constitution superadded to it? It appears to me to affect the final result but in a slight degree, whether we consider the First Cause as acting on created matter through the medium of a created quality, or dispensing with the latter altogether; since theseries of interpositions which must take place in this instance, may as necessarily be demanded in that, in order to ensure its continuation of existence.

It is easy to extend this reasoning to any conceivable case in material creation, and to conclude with the writer of the article, from which we have selected the foregoing quotations, that the doctrine of secondary causes may be upheld, "the question of an especial Providence and interference being left untouched." The only danger which arises from the former is the exclusive contemplation to which they habituate the mind of the philosopher. Disuniting them from the power in which alone their efficacy originates, he is thus led to assign them an undue importance, and lose in the soundness of his system what he gains in the splendor of its exterior. Such, under whatsoever de. nomination they present themselves, as Christians, we dispossess of their assumed station. The brilliancy of their acquirements atones not for the deficiencies of their faith. "Multa vera de creatura dicunt, at veritatem creaturæ artificem non pie quærunt, et ideo non inveniunt: aut si inveniunt, cognoscentes Deum, non sicut Deum honorant,......sed...colunt et serviunt creaturæ potius quam Creatori" (*).

This reconducts us to the consideration of the power, which originated those causes, conjointly with the mat

(*). Augustin. Confess. Lib. v. Cap. 3.

ter to which they have been superadded; and in this respect we cannot but conceive, that the views of Mr.. Penn are, to a certain extent, sound and demonstrable. The facts, of its exertion; of its independence on external circumstances,...place, time, and modes of previous being; of its being wholly irrespective of second causes, the existence of which are due to it alone; of its being, in fine, aught else but an energy of the self-existent Cause, effective by virtue of his unbounded and inconceivable fulness including within it the possibility of all being;—are consequences necessarily flowing from what we are competent to conceive of Almighty power, apart from its mode of determination, and its efficiency. When we attempt to define those latter, or particularise any class of assemblages as individually due to this mysterious power, we are wafted into the sea of doubtful conjecture, mistaking analogy for proof and hypothesis for sound argument.

Herein, it is conceived, consists the fallacy of the arguments alleged by the last-mentioned writer, in treating of Creative power. He presents us with an analogy, through which he endeavours to prove, that certain phænomena, at present obvious to our senses in the constitution of the mineral world, were anticipated by means of it, "without the mediation of time" (e), forgetting that his analogy respects subjects altogether diverse, and that no certainty of knowledge as to one kingdom of nature can enable us to extend our reasonings to particular groupes of the other. It were easy to offer a reason for this we know that the secondary qualities of matter originate, in daily experience, various phænomena of crystallization, stratification, etc. and we infer from thence, that the same causes were determined to analogous results, at periods beyond the reach of testimony

or experience. But we are destitute of any knowledge of any such causes operating to the production of organic forms, and we attribute these in consequence to the exertion of an active power. To conclude however, from the certainty of this exertion in the latter case, to the same certainty in the former, appears to be an assumption of the inadequacy of the causes in a case for which they seem to have been especially provided, and by their application to which the power and wisdom of the First Cause are most unanswerably attested.

This subject is resumed in Note (15) of Lecture iv., the purport of which, as of the present remarks, is to point out the difficulties attendant on our efforts to render that demonstrable, which can neither be subjected to experiment, nor referred to any known operation of the natural world, as congenerous with it, or even analogous. This, it is evident, is not to be received as militating. against the principles laid down in Lecture v. pp. 108, 117., relative to the completion of the relations of material assemblages; for we are at liberty to suppose, consistently with the views expressed therein of the meaning of Genesis, i. 2, that the agencies which led to it were not entirely simultaneous with Creation. This act being regarded as anticipative (Lect. iv. pp. 90 etc.), it follows, that even the Qualities of matter, and by the stronger reason, the orderly Disposition of many of its assemblages, may have been superadded at a period subsequent to its exertion. The appellation (Lect. v. p. 110.) seems to warrant this supposition, in the last of these cases, in a considerable degree. As to the first, the Reader is referred for the most probable opinion to Lecture iv. p. 91. The possibility of the contrary has been hinted at in this place, merely to show the weakness of the above-mentioned argument.

This leads us to an important distinction, which should not be overlooked in reasonings connected with the present subject; between the origination of matter and its qualities, and the modifications the former underwent in its constitution and disposition, during the series of events due to the latter. Where that terminated, we are certain these began; but difficulties which appear insurmountable prevent our fixing the limit by mere physical considerations. It has, as we have seen, been attempted through an analogy; and it is not the least of the services which Geology renders us, that it assists in rectifying the error.

Its researches point clearly to an epoch at which organic matter was first created, but leaves the period, at which the same result was effected in the case of inorganic, in absolute uncertainty.

Let it not be understood, however, that this absence of a determinate era sanctions either of the kindred errors, against which the system of Moses was especially directed; the Egyptian doctrine of an infinite succession of similar worlds, or the no less atheistic belief of the independent efficiency of second causes. The latter, as has been observed, are themselves creations; and included therefore in the announcement which introduces the demiurgic record. To suppose their operation invalidates not our soundest conceptions of the nature and acts of the Deity, as it means no more than this, that it pleased him to establish relations amongst the assemblages due to creative power, concurring to the production of a series of changes amongst them. The conclusion from hence, relative to the theistic doctrine of Moses, is obvious; and the very expression, BERESHITH, which stands at the head of his narra

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