on the 7th of April, and on the 8th agreed to atrempt a landing on the fouth-east of the ifland in a fandy bay, near Lochmaria point. Here the enemy were in poffeffion of a little fort; they had moreover entrenched themselves on an hill exceffively fteep, and the foot of which was fcarped away. The attempt was made in three places with great refolution; a few grenadiers got on fhore, and formed themselves; but as they were not fupported, they were for the greater part made prifoners. The reft of the army, after feveral very brave and repeated efforts, being wholly unable to force the enemies lines, or make good their landing, were obliged to

retire with lofs; what added to the difafter was, that feveral of the flat bottomed veffels were deftroyed or damaged in a hard gale, which followed on our retiring from the fhore. This made the profpect of any future attempt more unpleafing even than the firft. In this attack we loft in killed, wounded, and prifoners, near five hundred

4

opportunity of a fecond trial; however they perfifted with the utmoft fteadiness, and found at length a convenient fituation. Not that it was a part of the coast less strong than the reft; on the contrary they built their principal hopes on the exceffive fteepness and diffi culty of the rocks, which had rendered the enemy rather lefs attentive on this quarter. This ar duous attempt was made at a bold rocky fhore, near the abovementioned point of Lochmaria. Befides the principal attack, two feints were made at the fame time to distract the enemy, whilft the men of war directed their fire with great judgment and effect on the hills. These manoeuvres gave brigadier general Lambert with an handful of men an opportunity of climbing up a very fteep rock without moleftation, This little body having thus profperoufly gained the top of the hill, formed themselves in good order, and withApril 25. out delay. They were immediate by attacked by three hundred of the French, but they maintained their advantage with refolution until the whole corps of brigadier Lambert, which now had afcended in the fame manner, arrived to their affiftance, and repulfed the enemy.

The landing of all the forces was made good in a fhort time after. The lofs in this daring and fuccefsful attempt was inconfiderable. In one or two places the enemy feemed difpofed to make fome ftand; but the body of light horfe, which was embarked in this expedition, foon drove them to the town, and laid all quite open to the intrenchments before it. The great

difficulty

difficulty now confifted in bringing forward the cannon, which were 'first to be dragged up the rocks, and afterwards, for two leagues, along a very rugged and broken road. This neceffarily took up fome time. However the siege was commenced with vigour; and the garrifon, commanded by the che. valier de St. Croix, a brave and experienced officer, threatened on their fide a long and obftinate defence. Nothing in fact was defici ent on either part. The enemy made fome fallies; one of them with confiderable effect. Major-general Crawford was made prifoner on this occafion: but our troops were only animated by these checks. A furious attack was made upon the enemies lines which covered the town; and they were carried without much lofs; principally by the uncommon intrepidity of a corps of marines which had been but newly raised. No action of greater fpirit and gallantry had been performed during the whole war.

The town was now entirely abandoned, and the defence confined to the citadel. It was obvious, that, as our fleet prevented all communication with the continent, and thereby cut off all hope of relief, the place muft neceffarily be reduced; but the chevalier de St. Croix was refolved to provide for his own honour, when he could not for the prefervation of the place entrusted to him; and, fince he could not maintain it, to fell it as dear as poffible. Accordingly, there was no mention of yielding, until the feventh of June, when there was no longer the flighteft profpect of fuccour, and the place was by no VOL. IV.

means fafely tenable. Then he capitulated, and the garrifon marched out with the honours of war.

Thus was the island of Belleifle reduced under the English government, after a defence of two months. In this expedition we had about eighteen hundred men killed and wounded. The lofs most regretted was that of Sir W. Peere Williams, a young gentleman of great talents and expectations, and who had made a diftinguished figure in parliament. in parliament. He had but newly entered into the fervice. He was fhot in the night, by having carelefly approached too near a centinel of the enemy. He was the third gentleman of fashion whom, in this war, the love of enterprize had brought to an honourable death in thete expeditions to the coast of France.

Whatever difference of opinion might have been entertained concerning the value of this conqueft, or the price which was paid for it, the rejoicing in London was great and fincere. The general, and the land and fea officers employed in the expedition were the subject of very juft applause, who, with so noble a perfeverance, had struggled with, and had overcome fuch great difficulties, and who had the spirit, after fuch a difafter on their outfet, to renew an attack under circumftances nearly as unfavourable as thofe by which they had been at firft foiled. The city of London addreffed the king on the occafion; and it was generally expected, that this new proof of our fuperiority muft influence the negotiation in our favour. Some however were of opinion, that it [C]

would

would rather exafperate the French, and irritate their pride to renew thefe efforts which their misfortunes had flackened, when they faw us, in the midst of a treaty, making attempts and carrying places in Old France, and as it were in

the prefence of that haughty court. However, as there was nothing done that was not ftrictly juftifiable, no complaint was made; and the treaty proceeded, to all appearance, with as much good humour as before.

IV.

IT

T must be observed, that, though the courts of London and Ver failles treated feparately, it was hitherto by no means propofed, that this feparate difcuffion fhould lead to a feparate peace. It was no more than a previous arrangement for the removal of thofe difficulties, which might prevent the peace of France with England from being united with the general peace of Europe. But, in proportion as the treaty advanced, it became obvious that the fettling of any terms, which had no reference to the fignature of fomething obligatory between the two crowns, could at beft be only void and illufory, and might in the end even prove the fource of dangerous and captious altercations. The English minifter therefore, before he would agree to treat definitively upon any point, and particularly upon the epochas, inted upon two preliminary conditions.

First, that every thing, which fhould be happily adjusted between the two crowns, in relation to their particular war, fall be made obliga

tory final, and conclufive, independent of the fate of the negotiation of Augsburg.

Secondly, that the definitive treaty of peace between Great-Britain and France, or preliminary articles to that end, fhall be figned and ratified between the date of that memorial and the firft of the following Auguft.

If these conditions were accepted, then England, on her part, confented to name determinate epochas to which the uti poffidetis fhould refer; the firft of July for Europe; the firft of September for Africa and America; and the firft of November for the Eaft-Indies. The French miniftry, without contefting .he epochas themfelves, complained of the conditions; of the firft, because they faid it departed from the letter and fpirit of the memorial of the twenty-fixth of March, which was the foundation of the whole treaty; of the fecond, on account of the extreme thortness of the time allotted for the difcuffion of fuch difficult and momentous points; and the adjuftment of matters which regarded a war extended over the four quar

ters

ters of the globe; for the memorial which contained those conditions, was dated on the feventeenth, and was not received at Paris until the end of June; fo that little more than a month was left to obtain the confent of the court of Vienna to a feparate treaty, to fettle the terms of this treaty, and finally, to ratify

it.

If a very uncommon good underftanding had not fubfifted between her imperial majefty and the king of France, it must have been very difficult to have received this confent. But in fact it was immediately received, and upon one very fhort and apparently reasonable condition, "That nothing might be ftipulated to the prejudice of the house of Auftria." But when this condition came to be explained, as we shall see prefently, it was fo far from facilitating, that it created new obftacles to the peace. However, this acquiefcence of the principal of her allies enabled France to accept of the first condition without referve; and to the laft fhe verbally, though not in the cleareft terms, agreed alfo.

Things feemed, for the prefent, in the best fituation, which in this ftage of the treaty could be expected. The bafis of the negotiation was folidly eftablished. The article uti peffidetis, fince the taking Belleifle, was a matter of lefs difficulty, and the epochas were in general fettled in fuch a manner, as to coincide with the defigns and defires of both parties. The treaty was confined to the two powers, and it was to be perfectly definitive as to them. A time for concluding it was alfo in a great meafure fettled: a circumstance which, if it did not admit fufficient leifure

for accurate difcuffion, cut off however the opportunities of chicane, and feemed to be the most suitable to a candid proceeding, and a fincere defire of peace.

The foundation being thus laid, the fuperftructure was the next confideration. This fuperftructure confifted in the adjustment of those compenfations which were to be made for the reciprocal conquests (and here the difficulty lay) of the two powers; a punctilio of honour might have intervened at the very first fetting out, extremely pernicious to the falutary work in hand; from which party the firft propofition fhould proceed? But in this refpect France gave way, and that

conceffion afforded no inconfiderable proof of her pacific intentions.

We must apprize the reader that we do not mean to enter exactly into the whole detatil of this negotiation, nor undertake precisely to defcribe all the turns that were taken in it. This, we imagine, would prove a tedious and unacceptable performance. We shall attach ourselves to the capital objects which were contended for in this game of policy: we shall endeavour to point out the matters which firft obftru&ted, and then finally broke off the treaty; and we shall reft on these things in fuch a manner, as feems to us fitteft for marking out the true spirit of the negotiating powers. Our own obfervations fhall be very sparingly interpofed. We are hiftorians, and not advocates.

The uti poffidetis being fettled as the bafis of the treaty, nothing could reasonably be claimed by either party, that was not to be counterpoiled by fome equivalent from the other; and confequently

it was neceffary to adjust and value their feveral poffeffions, pretenfions, and demands. There were fix principal objects in this negotiation. Firft, the limits of the two crowns in North America. Secondly, the conquefts of Great Britain in the Weft Indies, together with the neutral islands there. Thirdly, our conquefts in Africa and in India. Fourthly, the adjustment of the particular affair between the English and French in Germany. Fifthly, the conduct which the two crowns were to hold with regard to their refpective allies in Germany And, laftly, the reftitution of the captures made by England, previous to the declaration of war.

On the first of thefe articles, France proposed to cede and guaranty all Canada to England; ftipulating only that the free and publick exercise of the Roman Catholick religion fhould be permitted under the English government, and that thofe of the old French colonifts who chose to retire might have leave to transport themselves from thence, and take away or difpofe of their effects. In compenfation for this, they required a cofirmation of the privilege of what fifhing they e.joyed on the coaft of Newfoundland, under the treaty of Utrecht; and, that this fishery might be carried on with advantage, they like wife required the reftitution of the ifle of Cape Breton, excluding themfelves in return from erecting on that ifland any kind of fortification whatfoever..

The affairs in the Weft Indies, which makes the fecond capital ob'ject, they propofed to fettle in this manner they offered to exchange Minorca for Guadaloupe and Mari

galante; and as to the four Neutral iflands, they infifted that two of them, Dominica and St. Vincent, were held by their natural inhabitants the Carribees, under the protection of France, and that they ought ftill to remain in the fame condition. With regard to the two others, they proposed to make a fair divifion; that St. Lucia fhould remain to France, and that England fhould enter into poffeffion of Torbago. On this head it is fufficient to obferve, that, in the opinion of fome people, our miniftry did not, in this treaty, fet the juft value on the acquifition they had made; when they looked upon Canada as the great and leading object and only confidered Guadaloupe and Marigalante in a fecondary and fubordinate light. This is a queftion of difficulty, and has been much agitated. Those who dread a fresh American war from the ambition of France, and were ftruck with the idea of extended empire, preferred the former conqueft; thefe who folely confidered our intereft as a commercial people, were generally in favour of the latter.

On the fide of Africa, France fatisfied herself with demanding either the fettlement at Senegal, or the ifle of Goree for which (together with the restoration of Belleifle) they confented to evacuate Gottingen, Heffe and Hanau, and to draw off their army to the Maine and the Rhine. This was certainly a full equivalent. But, with regard to the East Indies, they had no tolerable equivalent to offer. They expatiated much in their memorial upon the difadvantages which must alife to the companies of the two nations, from their entertaining