pointed for laying down their arms; the foldiers exclaiming, with tears in their eyes, that "they furrendered them to God alone;" and at the fame time feeming to derive great confolation from the opinion, that the victors could not boast of their conqueft in taking an hofpital. This circumftance of the indignation and grief expreffed by the British troops on laying down their arms, was mentioned in terms of admiration, and of the higheft honour to the garrifon, in the Spanich accounts which were publith ed of this transaction. The generous fympathy fhewn by the enemy upon this occafion, and their noble humanity after, was no lefs highly to their honour, It has been affured, by an authority not be queftioned, that feveral of the common foldiers of both armies, were fo moved by the wretched condition of the garrifon, that involuntary tears dropped from them as they paffed. The fubfequent humanity, kindness, and tenderness, fhewn by the Duke de Crillon, the Count of the fame name and family, and the Baron de Falkinhayn, who commanded the French troops, in their continued fupply of all neceffaries to the fick, and their unremitted attention to their recovery, was beyond all praife. Such acts "foften the rugged front of war," and tend to wear away all traces of rational enmity. Such was the fate of the inland of Minorca, near fourfcore years after its reduction by English arms and valour to the dominion of this country; and after being long confidered as one of the fplendid jewels of the British crown, as well as an illuftrious monument of our national power and renown. As the feafon for naval action began to open, great threats were held out, of the mighty effects to be produced by a combination of the whole naval force of France, Spain, and Holland; whofe united fleets, it was faid, to the amount of more than fixty fhips of the line, would fweep the coasts of Europe, from the Straits of Gibraltar to the extremities of Norway, and fpread defolation and ruin along the coafts of Great Britain and Ireland, in their paffage to and from the northern ocean. Unequal as our home force was to withitand this formidable combination, it became an object of the first importance to leffen the effect by preventing the entire completion of the union, which was only to be done by keeping fuch a watch upon the Dutch fleet as would difable them from penetrating the Channel, in their way to join our more fouthern enemies at Breft, which was the appointed place of rendezvous. Neceflary and important, however, as the attention to this object was, it could not but greatly reftrain and weaken our exertions on the coafts of France and Spain, and particularly increase that fecurity to their convoys, which, through their fucceffes in the war, and general fuperiority at fea, were now far more frequent and numerous than they ever had been before in any contest with this country. Under the preffure of this double neceffity, of equally providing with an inferior force for all the fervices and contingencies which might occur on either fide of the Channel, from the Naze of Norway Norway to the bottom of the Bay of Bifcay, it required the most confummate judginent in the new admiralty. then juft formed, as well as all the naval ability, by which our home commanders were at that time fo highly diftinguished, to mete out their attention and trength to either object with fo fteady a hand and fo nice a balance, that no lofs might be fuftained, or poffible advantage miffed, on the one fide, through any error or excefs in the portion of either allotted to the other. This plan of operation, though principally defentive, by no means excluded the defign of feizing every favourable opportunity of active service and adventure which might come in the way; but fo as not to lofe fight of the main objects. It indeed commenced with exertion. While the rest of the home fleet was in a state of more April 13th, Admiral or less preparation, Admiral Barrington 1782. failed from Portmouth for the Bay, with 12 fail of the line; and having arrived fomething less than a day's fail to the fouth-weft of Ufhant, Capt. Macbride, in the Artois frigate, made a fignat of difcovering an enemy's fleet. The Artois was fo far a-head, that although it was about noon, it was with the utmost difficulty the admiral could diftinguish the colour of the flag which he hoisted. The fignal for a general chace being zoth. immediately thrown out, the enemy began to be vifible about three o'clock from the maft-head; and the admiral's fhip, the Britannia, was foon left far behind by feveral of the prime failers. Of thefe, Capt. Jarvis, in the Foudroyant, fo far outstripped all the reft, that when night came on, with hazy and very blowing weather, he foon loft them entirely; but he kept a full view of the enemy, and purfued them with unremitting vigour. The chaced fleet confifted of 18 fail, laden with ftores, provifions, ammunition, and conveying a confiderable number of troops for the fupply and reinforcement of the French fleet and forces in the Eaft Indies; being particularly defigned to fupply the lofs of that convoy which had been taken by Admiral Kempenfeldt in the preceding winter. They had failed from Breft only the day before, and were under the protection of the Protecteur and Pegafé, of 74 guns each, L'Actionaire, of 64 guns, but armed ez fute, and a frigate.. The Foudroyant gaining fo faft upon the chace, that it became evident they could not get off without an engagement, the convoy was difperfed by fignal, and the two French 74 gun fhips having confulted, it was determined that as the Protecteur had a large quantity of money on board, the fhould make the best of her way; and that, if fighting was inevitable, the Pegafé fhould abide the confequences. This determination afforded an opportunity for one of the most fignal actions of the prefent war, and for placing the profeffional fkill and gallantry of Captain Jarvis in the moft confpicuous point of view. The two fhips were well matched in point of force and condition. Both were fresh from port; and' if a fuperiority in number of fix guns, in fuch high rates, could be 1 be thought any great matter of advantage on the fide of the Foudroyant, it was probably fully compenfated by the weight of metal on the other. A little before one in the morning, Captain Jarvis came up with, and closely engaged, the Pegafé, commanded by the Chevalier de Sillans. The action was extremely fierce while it lafted; but within less than an hour from its commencement, Capt. Jarvis laid the French fhip aboard on the larboard quarter, and the Pegafé was compelled to furrender. Nothing could afford a more striking inftance of the decided fuperiority of feamanflip and difcipline on the one fide, and of the great effects which they are capable of producing, than he circumstances of this action. The carnage in the Pegafé was beyond any thing that could have been fuppofed in fo fhort an action. Above fourfcore men were killed, and a great number wounded. The damage to the fhip was proportioned to the destruction of the men. Hull, mafts, and yards, were all materially injured. On the other fide, the damage to the Foudroyant was very trifling; not a man was killed; Capt. Jarvis himself, and a few feamen only, were wounded; his wound was flight, and none of the others mortal. It feemed peculiar, that the Protecteur and Pegafé, the guard of the prefent convoy, were witneffes to the lois of the former, under the fame deftination, when taken by Admiral Kempenfeldt. The weather was fo boisterous, and the fea fo extremely rough, that it was with the utmost diffi culty, and attended with the lofs of two boats, that Captain Jarvis could put an officer and 80 men on board the French fhip, and bring off about 40 of the prisoners. Thele circumftances, along with the shattered condition of the prize, and the difficulty of keeping together, began to render her fituation, in more refpects than one, critical; but the Queen man of war coming in fight foon after day-light, took upon her the charge of the disabled fhip; which was the more timely, as the Foudroyant and they foon loft fight of each other in the hard gale which ensued. The chace, along with the hard weather, had fo greatly scattered the British fquadron, that the Admiral was obliged to bring to, and continue in that pofition for forty-eight hours, in order to colleft the fhips. In the mean time, the purfuers were neither flack nor unfuccefsful in their chace; about a dozen fhips of the convoy, with feveral hundred troops on board, being brought fafe to England. The weather becoming more favourable on the morning of the day after the feparation of the Foudroyant, Capt. Maitland, of the Queen, had already taken out about 300 of the prifoners, and fent an officer with a party of men to reinforce thofe which Captain Jarvis had put on board the Pegafé, when a large man of war appeared in fight, which the French officers aflured him to be their late confort, the Protecteur, of 74 guns. Captain Maitland ordered the Pegale, and a cutter he happened to have in company, to make the beft of their way to the first convenient port in England, and, incumbered as he was with pri foners, The accounts which were received about this time of Sir George Rodney's 'decifive victory in the Weft Indies, of Sir Eyre Coote's fucceffes in the Eaft, and of the taking of Negapatam and Trincomale, ferved, along with foners, immediately pursued the enemy. After a chace of fourteen hours, he came up in the night with the French hip, and after pouring in his broadlide, and receiving hers, was much furpifed to find that fue truck her colours. But, instead of the Protecteur, the confidence founded on the the prize (much to the ditap- new administration, greatly to pointment of the cap:ain and raife the fpirits and hope of the His hip's company) proved to be nation; which indeed had fuffithe Actionaire, armed, as we have cient occafion for defpondency, obferved, en flute, but commanded under a feries of fuch unfortunate by an officer of rank and repu- events as are hitherto unequalled tation, and having 250 feamen in our history. and 550 foldiers on board; of which number nine were killed, and twenty-five wounded, by the fingle broadtide the received. This hip was in all respects, both as an acquifition and a lofs to the enemy, a very valuable prize, having a great quantity of naval and ordnance ftores on board, befides, wine, rum, provifions, and feve ral chefts of money. Capt. Maitland now had his hands fufficiently full; for befides the management of two great fhips, with the crew only of one, he was involved in the care of no less than 1100 prifoners. The accidental coming up of the Latona frigate, ferved, in a confiderable degree, to leffen this embarraffiment. The continuance of bad wea. ther obliged Admiral Barrington to finish this fhort but very fuccessful cruize, by returning to England towards the clofe of the month. Neither the Queen fhip of war nor the prizes had joined the fquadron before their return. It was much to the fatisfaction of the public that the order of the Bath was immediately after conferred on the gallant Sir John Jarvis. Environed as we were by pow erful enemies, both on the north and the fouth fide of the Channel, it was impoffible, with fo inferior a force at once to guard against their defigns, and to provide at the fame time for the effectual prefervation, in all its parts, of our commerce. Upon the return of Admiral Barrington's fquadron, Admiral Kempenfeldt failed with eight or nine ships of the line, to fupply their place in the bay; and May 3d.. intelligence being received that the Dutch were preparing with their whole force to come out of the. Texel, with a view, in the first instance, of convoying their great outward - bound fleets of merchantmen out of danger, and then of proceeding themfelves to fulfil the fcheme of joining our fouthern combined enemies, Lord Howe was obliged, in a week after Kempenfeldt's departure, to proceed with a iquadron of about a dozen fhips of the line, from Portsmouth to the coafts of Holland, in the hope of intercepting, or at least of confining the enemy, and of effectually fruftrating any defigns he might have formed upon upon our North Sea and Baltic trade. The Dutch fleet had already failed; but the intelligence of Lord Howe's movement obliged them to return haflily to the Texel. After cruizing near a month upon the Dutch coafts, the fquadron growing very fickly, being parti cularly affected by an epiden.ic diforder, which the extraordinary bad weather of that fummer had rendered generally prevalent, both by fea and land, and finding that the Dutch fhewed no manner of difpofition to venture out of the Texel, Lord Howe returned to Portfmouth, where being joined by the fhips from the Bay, under Admiral Kempenfeldt, every difpatch was used in preparing the fleet to oppofe the defigns of the combined enemy, who were foon expected to appear at the mouth of the Channel. M. de Guichen had been for fome time at Cadiz, from whence he and Don Cordova, with about 25 French and Spanish fhips of the line, failed in the beginning of June, and in their progrefs to the northward, while they expected to be joined by the fquadrons from Breft and other ports, they fell in with our outwardbound Newfoundland and Quebec fleets, which were under the convoy of Admiral Campbell, who, in a 50 gun fhip, accompanied by fome frigates, was going to his command at the former of thete ftations, for the protection of the fishery. About 18 of the convoy, laden chiefly, if not entirely, with provifions, were taken; the fhips of war, with the remainder, had the good fortune to escape. The enemy being now entire mafters of the fea, from the mouth of the Straits to Ufhant, were able to dispatch their great outwardbound convoys, and to receive their homeward, with the utmost facility and safety; while we were under no fmall apprehenfion for the fafety of a rich and great convoy from Jamaica, which was on its way home, under the care of Admiral Sir Peter Parker, with only three fhips of the line for its protection. Lord Howe failed from Portfmouth early in July, accompanied by the Admirals Barrington, Sir J. L. Rofs, and Kempenfeldt; but thefe diftinguifhed commanders had only 22 hips of the line to fupport their defigns and adventure, while the combined fleets were cruizing about the chops of the Channel with more than double their force. Lord Howe kept to the weftward of the enemy, in order to protect and receive the Jamaica fleet; and it required all the dexterity and profeffional skill which eminently diftinguifhed that nobleman, and the commanders acting along with him, to fecure this object, and at the fame time to avoid being forced into an engagement, where the vast fuperiority of force against him, could not but produce fome degree of its proper effect. Sir Peter Parker arrived fafe with his convoy by the end of July; the combined enemy derived as little advantage from this as they had from their preceding adventures upon the Channel; and the Dutch fleet still continued unable to join them. The return of the fleet to Portfmouth was marked by a calamity of the most grievous kind, and |
