viz. to what is proper and for the petitioner's good. Now, however the cafe may have been heretofore, it seems to be an useless promise now; and, therefore, it may feem to follow, that either now Chrift has no dif ciples, at least, among us; or elfe, that now this promife is of none effect; for, notwithstanding the numerous fervent prayers of the faithful, things feem to take their natural course, as to profperity and adverfity, health and fickness, and every thing elfe, with which they are concerned, in this world, and of which an inftance can scarce bet produced to the contrary. Befides, as God is the most perfect intelligence and boundlefs goodness; fo, he does not need to be spurred up, by our prayers, to do what is right, nor will all our importunity prevail upon him to do what is wrong. On the other fide, if prayer be confidered as a pofitive inftitution, or fomething of like kind, the ground of which is not previous in nature, but only in the use of it it may be fubfervient to the petitioner's good, by introducing in him fuch proper reflections, and, thereby, proper affections and actions, as, otherwise, his affairs and advocations would divert him from; I fay, if this be the cafe, then the

fore

forementioned difficulties feem to vanish. And, in this view of the case, God is not mocked by being invoked; for, as the invoker does not propofe to inform the Deity, nor to make any alteration in him, by his prayers, but only ufes God's name by way of petition, &c. in order to raise in his own mind fuch proper reflections, and, thereby, such affections and actions as will render him pleafing to his maker; fo, he neither defires nor expects to have his prayers answered, in any other way than through the natural course of things. If he If he prays for the forgiveness of his fins, he neither defires nor hopes to obtain forgivenefs, in any other way than by rendering himself the proper object of mercy; if he prays for his daily bread, he neither defires nor expects a fupply, but in the courfe of God's general providence, with refpect to which, he is fenfible, his prayers can make no alteration.

AND, fuppofing there be an impropriety, in praying to God for what prayer will not be a means to obtain; yet, that impropriety, or prayer, thus circumftanced, furely, is not mocking of God. Whether fuch impropriety ought to be a bar to prayer, or whether it be displeafing to God, are quef

tions

tions quite diftinct and different from the queftion under confideration, viz. whether praying to God for what prayer will not be a means to obtain, be mocking God? It has been, and ftill is, a practice, among pious people, to fay grace (as it is called) both before, and after meat; by which invocation of the Deity, no man of common fenfe, furely, does defire, or expect, that God will miraculously work any change in the qualities of the food to be eaten, or in the difpofitions of the ftomachs that are to receive it; but only, that, by these acts of piety, or devotion, a fenfe of God's providential goodness may be impressed upon the mind, with a thankful remembrance thereof; and to call this mocking of God, feems, at leaft, to be a hard faying.

BUT farther, the term religion is, by fome men, annexed to the motives to action, and not to the actions themselves; and thus, actions take the denomination of being religious from the religious motives which are the ground and reafon of them, and obedience to God's will and a view to his glory are what conftitute religious motives fo that, when an action is done in obedience to God's laws and with a referrence to his

;

glory,

glory, it is a religious action, and all actions, that spring from any other motive, are not religious actions. Here, the article [with referrence to God's glory] feems to be fupernumerary, because the glory which accrues to God, in this cafe, arifes from the obedience that is paid to his laws; and, therefore, to do a thing in obedience to God's laws, and with referrence to his glory, is the fame thing. And here, I think, it may not be improper to take notice of a doctrine that has been advanced, viz. that felfishness is the fole principle of action to men; and if fo, there can be no foundation for the above diftinction, viz. of religious motives and other motives: For as, upon the prefent fuppofition, there is, to man, but one common motive to action, viz. selfishness; so, obedience to God's will is not that motive, nor is it any motive to action at all, becaufe it is not obedience to God's will, but the advantage the agent propofcs to obtain by that obedience, which is the motive to action to him. But then, that felfishness is the fole principle of action to men, of this, I prefume, every man's experience convinces him to the contrary: For, tho' the affection of felf-love, which has a very great influence

upon

upon man, was, by the author of our beings, made a part of the human conftitution, the viciating of which affection, I apprehend, to be the great corruption of human nature; yet, I think, there is scarce a man fo viciously felfish, but what, in fome few inftances, at leaft, acts from a better and more generous principle.

BUT to return: I have obferved, that the term religion is, by fome men, annexed to the motives to action, and in this, I think, there can be no difpute; because every man is at liberty to annex to his words what ideas he pleases, provided he explains himself and shews what thofe ideas are, that fo no other man may be imposed upon thereby. But this is not all. For, as there is a disparity betwixt motives, one being more valuable than another; fo, obedience to God's will is reprefented to be the most worthy and valuable motive to action, in man. Upon which I observe, that as the fame action may be done from different motives, and as one motive is preferrable to another; fo the prefent enquiry is, what there is, in nature, to be the ground of that preferrence, and by which one motive may properly be faid to be better, or more valu

able,