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of men placed in fuch fituations as are favourable to the proper exertions of taste. Every one must perceive, that among rude and uncivilized nations, and during the ages of ignorance and darkness, any loofe notions that are entertained concerning fuch fubjects, carry no authority. In thofe ftates of fociety, taste has no materials on which to operate. It is either totally fuppreffed, or appears in its loweft and most imperfect form. We refer to the fentiments of mankind in polished and flourishing nations; when arts are cultivated and manners refined; when works of genius are fubjected to free difcuffion, and taste is improved by fcience and philofophy.

Even among nations at fuch a period of society, I admit, that accidental caufes may occafionally warp the proper operations of tafte; fometimes the ftate of religion, fometimes the form of government, may for a while pervert it; a licentious court may introduce a tafte for false ornaments, and diffolute writings. The ufage of one admired genius may procure approbation for his faults, and even render them fashionable. Sometimes envy may have power to bear down, for a little, productions of great merit; while popular humour, or party fpirit, may, at other times, exalt to a high, though fhort-lived reputation, what little deferved it. But though fuch cafual circumftances give the appearance of caprice to the judgments of taste, that appearance is easily corrected. In the course of time, the genuine taste of human nature never fails to disclose itself, and to gain the afcendant over any fantastic and corrupted modes of tafte which may chance to have been introduced. Thefe may have currency for a while, and mislead fuperficial judges; but being fubjected to examination, by degrees they pafs away; while that alone remains which is founded on found reafon, and the native feelings of men.

I by no means pretend, that there is any ftandard of taste, to which, in every particular inftance, we can refort for clear and immediate determination. Where, indeed, is such a standard to be found, for deciding any of thofe great controverfies in reafon and philofophy, which perpetually divide mankind? In the prefent cafe, there was plainly no occafion for any fuch ftrict and abfolute provifion to be made. In order to judge of what is morally good or evil, of what man ought, or ought not in duty to do, it was fit that the means of clear and precife determination fhould be afforded us. But to afcertain in every cafe with the utmoft exactness what is beautiful or elegant, was not at all neceffary to the happiness of man. And therefore fome diverfity in feeling was here allowed to take place; and room was left for difcuffion and debate, concerning the degree of approbation to which any work of genius is entitled.

The conclufion, which it is fufficient for us to rest upon, is, that tafte is far from being an arbitrary principle, which is fubject to the fancy of every individual, and which admits of no criterion for determining whether it be falfe or truc. Its foundation is the fame in all human minds. It is built upon fentiments and perceptions which belong to our nature; and which, in general, operate with the fame uniformity as our other intellectual principles. When these fentiments are perverted by ignorance and prejudice, they are capable of being rectifed by reafon. Their found and natural ftate is ultitimately determined, by comparing them with the general tafte of mankind. Let men declaim as much as they pleafe, concerning the caprice and the uncertainty of taste, it is found, by experience, that there are beauties, which, if they be difplayed in a proper light, have power to command lafting and general admiration. In every compofition, what

interests the imagination, and touches the heart, pleafes all ages and all nations. There is a certain ftring, to which, when properly ftruck, the human heart is fo made as to anfwer.

Hence the univerfal teftimony which the most improved nations of the earth have confpired, throughout a long tract of ages, to give to fome few works of genius; fuch as the Iliad of Homer, and the Eneid of Virgil. Hence the authority which fuch works have acquired as ftandards, in fome degree, of poetical compofition; fince from them we are enabled to collect what the sense of mankind is, concerning those beauties which give them the highest pleasure, and which therefore poetry ought to exhibit. Authority or prejudice may, in one age or country, give a temporary reputation to an indifferent poet, or a bad artift: but when foreigners, or when posterity examine hist works, his faults are difcerned, and the genuine taste of human nature appears. "Opinionum commenta delet dies; naturæ judicia confirmat." Time overthrows the illufions of opinion, but establishes the decifions of nature.

LECTURE III.

CRITICISM.-GENIUS.

PLEASURES OF TASTE.

SUBLIMITY IN OBJECTS.

TA

ASTE, criticifin, and genius, are words currently employed, without diftinct ideas annexed to them. In beginning a courfe of lectures, where fuch words must often occur, it is necessary to ascertain their meaning with fome precision. Having in the last lecture treated of taste, I proceed to explain the nature and foundation of criticifm. True criticism is the application of taste and of good fenfe to the feveral fine arts. The object which it propofes is, to diftinguifh what is beautiful and what is faulty in every performance; from particular inftances, to afcend to general principles; and fo to form rules or conclufions, concerning the feveral kinds of beauty in works of genius.

The rules of criticism are not formed by any induction, a priori, as it is called; that is, they are not formed by a train of abstract reasoning, independent of facts and obfervations. Criticifm is an art founded wholly on experience—on the obfervation of fuch beauties as have come nearest to the standard which I before established; that is, of

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fuch beauties as have been found to pleafe mankind moft generally. For example; Ariftotle's rules concerning the unity of action in dramatic and epic compofition, were not rules firft difcovered by logical reafoning, and then applied to poetry; but they were drawn from the practice of Homer and Sophocles they were founded upon obferving the. fuperior pleafure which we receive from the relation of an action which is one and entire, beyond what we receive from the relation of fcattered and unconnected facts. Such obfervations, taking their rife at first from feeling and experience, were found, on examination, to be fo confonant to reafon, and to the principles of human nature, as to pass into established rules, and to be conveniently applied for judging of the excellency of any performance. This is the moft natural account of the origin of criticifm.

A masterly genius, it is true, will, of himself, untaught, compofe in fuch a manner as fhall be agreeable to the most material rules of criticifm; for as these rules are founded in nature, nature will often fuggeft them in practice. Homer, it is more than probable, was acquainted with no fyftems of the art of poetry. Guided by genius alone, he compofed in verfe a regular ftory, which all posterity has admired. But this is no argument against the ufefulness of criticifm as an art. For as no human genius is perfect, there is no writer but may receive affistance from critical obfervations upon the beauties and faults of those who have gone before him. No obfervations or rules can indeed fupply the defect of genius, or inspire it where it is wanting. But they may often direct it into its proper channel; they may correct its extravagancies, and point out to it the most just and proper imitation. of nature. Critical rules are defigned chiefly to how the faults that ought to be avoided. To na Vol. I. F

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