* unreasonable communication of the con

.C

trary is unkind and evil; and, in my opinion, renders the communicating agent the proper object of resentment; that is, it renders him worthy to have the evil • retaliated upon him, which he fo bafely laid upon others. But then, it is not impropriety of action, confidered fimply as fuch, but the base and vile introduction of mifery, which I make the ground and reafon of punishment. And, in this view of the cafe, punishment may be said to be relative to guilt; (that is, to fuch guilt as before-mentioned) as there is a propriety and fitness in inflicting the former, upon account of the latter. Were I to fee a man rip up women with child, take young children and dash them against the ftones, and commit other like barbarities, I should think it fuitable and proper, and what he justly deferved, to lay fo:ne heavy burthen of affliction upon him, as a punishment for fuch cruelty, confidered abstractedly from any benefit he might receive thereby. And as the cafe appears thus to me ; thus to me; so I cannot but approve of the divine conduct, in planting in man the paffion of refentment, or an inclination to render evil for evil; thơ' VOL. I. Ee

this

.

any

this paffion, like all other parts of the human conftitution, is liable to be perverted and misapplied. And when the suffering agent is led to see, from the juftness or propriety of his punishment, the bafeness of his actions, which were the ground and reafon of that punishment, and which, in other view, I think, punishment does not point out; then he stands fair for repentance and reformation. However, in all this, I apprehend, you differ in your • fentiments from me. You fuppofe, to lay any punishment upon the moft barbarous creature that ever exifted, for, or on ac• count of his barbarity, would be to act unjustly and cruelly by him; whereas, I think, it would be acting properly by him, and as h juftiy deferves, whether it may properly be called cruelty, or not.

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And

here I beg leave to afk, why punishment (or if you please cruelty) fhould be used as a means to amendment? For tho' the end, viz. amendment, is worthy and valuable and much to be defired; yet the means, viz. cruelty, is bad, (upon your principles) and much to be detefted. I might also ask, what connection is there betwixt punishment and reformation? or

'how

how does the former become a proper means to the latter? not phyfically; be¿ cause pain and mifery, or uneafinefs, rather

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tend to ruffle and diftract, than to com

pofe and rectify the disorders of the mind. And if pain and misery or punishment be 'confidered as unconnected with guilt, (I

mean fuch guilt as aforefaid) and if it be arbitrary and unjustly laid upon a creature, ' which upon your principles it seems to be; then, tho' it may lead the fufferer to curfe bis fate, yet the question will be, how can it be to him a reasonable ground of reformation? and admitting that pain naturally leads the suffering agent to reflection; yet if that pain be arbitrarily and ¿ unjustly laid upon him, which I think your principles suppose, then the question again takes place, (viz.) how can it be to to him a reasonable ground of reforma⚫tion * ?

* Ir has been obferved above, And when thǝ fuffering agent is led to fee, from the juftness or propriety of his punishment, the baserefs of his actions which were the ground and reason of that punishment, and which, I think, in any other view, punishment does not "point out; then he stands fair for reformation.' By which I mean, that punishment, in this view of the cafe, has a natural tendency to lead the offender to reform or purge himself of that evil difpofition which was the cause

E e 2

of

of his miscarriage. But then, by a natural tendency, I mean, not a phyfical, but a moral tendency, as a criminal by seeing the baseness of his actions, in the juftness of his punishment, fees, as it were in a glafs, how greatly he has debafed himself, and acted below his character thereby; and that, furely, is a reasonable and proper ground of disliking himself and his paft conduct, and of acting more properly, and more fuitable to his intelligent nature, for time to come; which change is ufually expreffed by those terms, viz. repentance and reformation. Whereas, were punishment to be arbitrarily and unjustly inflicted upon a criminal, that is, when he had not done any thing for whichhe justly deserved fuch correction; then, this punishment, furely, could have no moral influence upon the offender, fo as to lead him to reformation; because, as the corrector, in fuch a cafe, would act the very fame part by the criminal, as the criminal had done by another, and even that which conftituted his crime, viz. made another miferable, who had not done any thing justly to deferve it, fo the criminal's conduct, in a moral view, would not be condemned, but would rather be justified thereby, as having even the divine example to countenance it. To fay, that punishment, in this cafe, is defigned and intended to reform the offender; and therefore, he ought to be reformed. thereby, I think, is not to the purpofe; because the offender ought to reform, whether he be corrected, or not; and because the queftion before us, is not, what punishmentis, or may be defigned and intended for? butonly, whether punishment, when confidered as irrelative to guilt, and abftractedly from the intention of the inflictor, has a natural tendency to amend the fuffering offender, by being. to him a reasonable and proper ground of reformation? when, in this view of the cafe, it does not in the least shew, or point out to him his deformity, nor the impropriety of his actions; and therefore, it may feem to be groundlefly and unreasonably laid upon him. But if punishment be confidered as connected with, or relative to guilt, that is, if he, who, without any just ground, makes another miserable, does thereby juftly deferve to be made miferable bimfelf; then, as he may fee his own deformity, and the propriety of his amendment, in the punishment he fuf

fers;

fers; fo his correction appears to be proper and just, whether he improves it to his amendment, or not.

However, I have not denied, but admitted, that pain and mifery may be a means to reformation. A man that has caufelefly made others miferable, when he becomes unhappy himself, and has a quick and feeling sense of his ewn mifery, may be led by it, to look back, and fee the unkind and improper part he has acted, in groundlefly making others fo; and that may lead him to repentance and reformation. But then, it is an experimental feeling of mifery itself, considered abstractedly from the ground and caufe of it, which produces this effect; and therefore, it would produce this effect, whether it were inflicted as punishment, and confidered as fuch, or not. And if the feeling of pain and mifery, confidered abstractedly from punishment, may produce fuch an effect; then, the adding to it the moral fenfe of its being inflicted as a just punishment upon the fufferer for his having causelesly made others miferable, this greatly heightens or increases the ground, or reason, arifing from it, for repentance and reformation; and the inflicting it as a punishment is justified, whether it be productive of amendment, or not. Upon the whole of this argument, I observe, that as we have all the certainty the nature of the thing will admit, that the divine conduct, in all things, in all inftances and cafes, will be conformable to perfect rectitude; fo we are thereby certain that the Deity will not punish needlefly, or without any just ground, nor will he extend it beyond its proper bounds.

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