"Ane gritter synner wals not borne In daille of fayre Scotlande: You knowe you stole Jock Laidleyis corne, And though menne knowit you were forsworne, You treited theyre complaynte with scorne, "Och fie, Johnne Graime! you sordid slaife! In vertue, knawledge, and in graice, "And there's ane thraldom byding thee, Tyme was-tyme is-but wille not bee, "Alake!" sayis Johnne, "It grefis me sorre, I thochte I had bein deidde before, Then Johnne knelit downe in hombil waye, And prayit als loude als manne colde praye, "Johnne!" cryit his wyffe, quha laie awaike, "Whisht, wyffe !" sayis Johnne, " for I am deidde, And praying on the skie. Quhatis this? I knowe myne soulle is fledde, Or verry soone moste flie; For there is ane aingel on the waye; How lang hee taikis, I cannot saye; But or to-morrow, or to-daye, Poore auld Johnne Graime moste die; "And taike your chaunce lyke mony a shippe Johnne rose, and swore hee wolde restore; Quha wolde not lette theyre menne repente, Johnne lokit at all his yowes and kie, But still hee swore he wolde restorre, They yermit and flaitte ane sommeris daye, And juste als spredde the glomyng graye, The aingel with the warrande caime, Hee gaif ane shiver, and but one, The slaiffe of that o'erpoweryng vyce, This carle was haited whylle he levit, That he's quhare mercy's rayis combynę, Whilke menne wille notte disowne. ! THE CORN LAW AND A FIXED DUTY. THE Corn Law amply demonstrates that it is far more easy to change than improve; it is complained of by all sides. It was at any rate to produce steadiness of price, but it produces far greater fluctuations than the old laws; the free-traders abuse it as a monopoly, and the agriculturists assert it admits foreign corn almost free of duty. Improvement is again the cry, and as people in these days will neither learn from, nor regard experience, the matter is to be improved into a much more defective and injurious condition. The corn-growers in various quarters are intimating that a fixed duty would be preferable to the law, and in some are calling for one in lieu of it. It seems certain that the question will undergo serious discussion before the end of the present Session of Parliament, and there is strong probability that early change is inevitable. On the one side Earl Grey has only asked that a new enquiry may be a little delayed, and the creed of his party may well justify alarm touching its results; on the other, Mr Courtenay, the late Vice-President of the Board of Trade, has avowed himself a friend to free trade in corn, and however insignificant he may be as an individual, his party connexion renders his avowal deserving of notice. The next great question will be found in the Corn Law, and in some points the latter is indefensible. All, therefore, who wish for such a change as will be beneficial, will do well to enquire rigidly before they give judgment; and the object of this Article is to assist them in such enquiry. Touching the off-hand people who oracularly pronounce, that because the law is injurious, a fixed duty would be faultless, we merely observe, we heartily wish agriculture were rid of all such advocates. The questions to be solved are evidently these. What is the operation of the Corn Law in regard to price and importation? What would be the operation of a fixed duty in these matters? If certain ends be agreed on respecting price and im portation, what would be the best means of attaining them? We shall look at them without reference to principle or system, and solely to discover fact. Whether agriculture ought to have protection, or nonewhether one price is too high, or another is too low, are matters which we shall not notice. Commencing with the first question. When the Corn Law was passed, we stated it gave a bounty on speculation, and would cause far greater fluctuations of prices than the old ones had done. This has been fully verified by experiment. With average crops this country barely produces as much corn as it consumes; if they be deficient even in but a slight degree, it must import. In consequence, a short supply of home-grown corn at spring, with the chance of bad weather, must, without a supply of foreign corn, raise prices, and it must raise them to that point which will bring the foreign corn into the market. Under the law, prices with full supply must sink to the point which will exclude foreign corn by means of heavy duty, and as they rise the duty falls. At the spring time of short supply, the importer has a certainty, that if he keep his corn in bond, he will be able to obtain for it a much higher price, and get it into the market at the lowest duty. He has on the quarter of wheat a certain bounty of from ten to fifteen shillings in price, and from twenty to twenty-five shillings in duty—in all, of from thirty to forty shillings secured to him for keeping his corn back, raising prices, and providing a field for speculation. If he have not the means of holding his corn until price reaches its height, he can as easily sell it in bond, as out of it. At such a time it is foreseen that foreign corn will be admitted at a low duty, and in consequence the importer gives a price for it abroad which will not suffer it to be cleared at a high one; it then passes from one speculator to another in bond, until the last holder can only afford As it is to clear it at the lowest. thus practically prohibited from be ing cleared until duty falls to the lowest figure, speculators are incited to operate on home-grown corn, by the certainty that price must rise ten or fifteen shillings per quarter. It necessarily follows that all the foreign corn imported in the year, is brought into the market in an overwhelming mass about harvest; the main part of that imported last year was cleared after harvest commenced. For some time after, the market overflows with excellent old foreign wheat, while new English is out of condition; the inevitable consequence is, English wheat sustains a fall of perhaps twenty shillings per quarter, and only the better qualities are saleable. This violent fall is only part of the evil: with an average price of 60s. very many farmers cannot obtain more than 45s. or 50s., and they can scarcely sell their wheat on any terms. This heavy loss to the British producer is only partly a gain to the consumer. While the law forces the foreign corn up until it can only be afforded at a high price, it forces the British off at a glut price; the miller gains the latter on his own terms for mixing, therefore he gives more for the former, which is, to a large extent, held by a virtual monopoly. Wheat is made dear a little before and during harvest, when the generality of farmers have none to sell; and through this it is made, when they have their crop to dispose of, much cheaper to them than to the consumers. After harvest, when the average price of English is 56s., the consumers pay one of perhaps 66s. Thus the loss to the farmers is, in a great degree, a gain, not to the consumers, but to foreigners and speculators. great difference to him, on the whole, whether the duty be twenty shillings or one; if it be the higher sum, he, in effect, makes the foreign growers pay it; if it be the lower one, the difference is principally pocketed by such growers and speculators. As duty falls in this country, price rises abroad, and vice versa; therefore the difference of duty affects chiefly, not the importer, but the foreign producer and dealer. In plentiful years, very large importations of wheat can be made with a duty of 25s. per quarter. A gazette price of 60s. or 61s. will admit of such an import as will speedily sink it several shillings. Nothing can be more erroneous than the idea that price will fall no farther than is necessary for making the duty a prohibition; if at 59s. it make the duty a prohibition, it must, in plentiful times, fall to 55s. Many people argue that the Corn Law affords scarcely any protection, because it admits great part of the foreign wheat at a duty almost nominal. This is erroneous. If the duty were never lower than 10s., the foreign grower would obtain less for his wheat, and in general the British consumer would pay no more for it than he does at present; importation would be a little smaller, but the British farmer, save in years of great scarcity, would gain no higher prices of moment. The present Corn Law, therefore, compels the average price of wheat to fluctuate between about 54s. and 75s.; with it, such price must, of necessity, fluctuate to this violent extent almost annually. Let us now enquire how a fixed duty would operate. Two very different parties advoWith an average crop, price conti- cate one; the first consists of the nues low until spring, and then, if professed friends of agriculture, who there be a prospect of another good have not, as far as we know, stated one, the importer will not buy abroad what duty would please them. As save at low rates; he has the foreign we imagine they would require a growers at his mercy, because, in ge- high one, we will look first at one of neral, they must find a market in 20s. At spring, with short supply this country, or be without one. If and the chance of bad weather, there abundant supply keep price down, would be a certainty that price would he can bring foreign wheat into con- rise greatly, if foreign wheat should sumption, with a duty on it of 20s. be kept from consumption; the imor 258., and still get nearly as much porter, of course, would have a large profit as he can do when the duty is bounty, amply sufficient to be irreonly 1s. The fact is, it makes no sistible with him, on keeping his wheat back and raising prices; in addition, he could sell this wheat as readily in bond as out of it. We have said a duty of 10s. per quarter would not much affect importation and price; one of 20s., however, would affect them greatly. With an average price of 72s., importation would be far larger under a duty of 10s. than under one of 20s.; probably 82s. would be requisite for gaining the same supply with the higher duty, which 72s. would gain with the lower one. Price must, of necessity, be higher or lower, as supply is smaller or larger. The certainty that England must import always, raises prices abroad, but at present the advance is lost by the Exchequer, and not paid by the consumer. With a fixed duty, all the addition made to price abroad would have to be added to it at home; in consequence, no considerable quantity of foreign wheat could be taken out of bond, or imported, until price should rise to perhaps 80s. Thus, with a fixed duty of 20s., there would be about the same keeping of foreign wheat from consumption-speculation and advance of price-overflow of foreign, and sudden fall of English wheat, at the close of harvest-which are now witnessed. The main difference would be, wheat at the highest point would be several shillings per quarter dearer with the duty than it is with the existing law. We have assumed, that, in plentiful moments, a duty of about 27s. is necessary for constituting a prohibition, when the average price is about 60s. Of course, to make a fixed duty of 208. a prohibition, the average price must be 53s. We have said, that in such moments the average price must be several shillings below that which makes the duty a prohibition; the fixed duty in question would bring a very large quantity of foreign wheat into the market, with an average price of 56s., and it would sink this price to about 48s. A fixed duty of 20s. would, therefore, compel the average price of wheat to fluctuate almost annually between 48s. and 80s.; in almost every year, this price would be nearly as low as the one sum, and as high as the other. The other advocates of a fixed duty, who consist of the professed enemies of agriculture, call for one as low as possible. We will look at the one of 8s. With the present law, foreign corn may be bonded at any time and there is generally a certainty, that, in some part of the year, it can be taken out of bond almost free from duty. In consequence, importation is as free, and about as extensive, as it would be if this corn were subject to neither law nor duty. At spring, therefore, short supply, &c., would have the effects, with a duty of 8s., or without one, which they now have. If a fixed duty of 8s. should have any operation, it would necessarily make foreign wheat several shillings dearer at harvest than the existing law makes it. If, in plentiful times, a duty of 278., with an average price of about 60s., be necessary to form a prohibition, it follows that a price of 41s. would be required for making a duty of 8s. a prohibition. In such times, an average price of 43s., with a fixed duty of 8s., would bring a very great quantity of foreign wheat into the market for consumption, and prices would sink to perhaps 36s. or 38s. A fixed duty, therefore, of 8s. would compel the average price of wheat to fluctuate almost yearly between 38s. and 76s. In years of scarcity, a fixed duty would make corn considerably dearer than the existing law makes it, Thus, the assertions of the advocates of such a duty, that it would make the trade in corn less speculative, and price more steady, are the reverse of fact. Doubtlessly, in times of short supply, it would only offer a rise of price, as a bounty on speculation, while the law offers both a rise and a large reduction of duty; but it would ensure a greater rise than the law can do. At present, the duty is taken into account by both buyer and foreign seller; the fall in it is chiefly pocketed by the latter, and, in consequence, it is much the same to the former, in regard to speculation, as a fixed one would be. A fixed duty would make corn, in plentiful times, much cheaper, and in those of short supply, somewhat dearer than the law makes it; in consequence, it would give as great a bounty on speculation as is given by the law. Under the latter, a large |