may be administered, for which end you have been principally constituted and ordained. O my lord king! consider how small a power, when compared with thine, thy ancestors enjoyed, and yet they punished criminals of yet superior rank to our opponent, as any one may see who shall read our history of former times. Besides, who are they that would dare to oppose their sovereign lord, who, doing an act of justice according to the evidence of truth, becomes a true and upright judge, as Tully showeth, in his second book of Offices: Judicis est semper verum sequi.' A good judge should give judgment according to truth.

"The same author says, in one of his orations before he went into banishment,- Nemo tam facinorosus inventus est vita, ut non tamen judicum prius sententiis convinceretur, quam suppliciis applicaretur.' No one has led so wicked a life but that a verdict has been passed upon his case before he was put to the torture. Thou art bounden, most potent king, to do justice; and should any evil result from it, it will fall on the adverse party, on account of his crimes, as I shall show to you hereafter. The judgment of our LORD JESUS CHRist will not certainly fail of having its effect: Qui de gladio percutit, gladio peribit.' Whoso kills with the sword shall die by the sword. And Övid, in his Art of Love, says, 'Neque lex est æquior ulla, quam necis artifices arte perire sua.' No law is more just than that murderers should perish by their own arts. O my lord king! open the gates of justice, and listen to the very reasonable complaints which my lady of Orleans makes to thee, that thou mayest verify in thyself the words of the prophet, 'Dilexisti justitiam et odisti iniquitatem, propterea unxit te Deus tuus oleo lætitiæ præ consortibus tuis;' that is to say, Thou hast loved justice, and hast hated iniquity, wherefore the Lord thy God has anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows;-and this finishes my fifth argument.

My sixth and last argument, for the present, is founded on the conduct and demeanour of our opponent after this cruel and detestable crime. There is nothing in this world a king should so much dread and check as the overbearing pride of any subject in regard to his government; and thou, O king! oughtest to follow, in thy governance, the example of the King of kings, of whom holy writ says, 'Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam. God humbles the proud, and raises up the weak-hearted. Thou art therefore bound to humble the pride of our opponent, which has increased to such a pitch as to make him resist thy power in the support of this his wicked deed.

"Oh! king of France, and all ye my lords, weigh well then the rebellion and disobedience of our adversary, not only against the commands of the king, but contrary to the orders of the whole royal council. It is a well known fact, that the king of Sicily, my lord of Berry, and several others, went lately to Amiens, notwithstanding the great severity of the season, to attempt bringing about a reconciliation between the parties, for the general good of the king and kingdom; but these lords, in truth, could not effect this, though they signified to our opponent the king's commands, but he contended that he would not wait upon his sovereign until he should be sent for by the king himself. When the aforesaid lords advised him to obey the king's commands, they could scarcely obtain from him a promise not to come to the king with a great power of men-at-arms; and even then he delayed his coming for fifteen days. Consider, my lords, what sort of obedience this is, and what fatal consequences may ensue from it. After the conference at Amiens, what was his conduct? Why, he assembled so large a force of men-at-arms, that when he came to Paris, he seemed as if he would conquer the whole kingdom. It is true, indeed, that the king and the princes of his blood, hearing of this, collected a sufficient power to provide a remedy. But when the king had commanded him, by especial messengers, not to enter Paris with more than two hundred men-at-arms, he came accompanied by more than six hundred, in direct opposition to the king's orders. On his arrival in Paris with so large a force, it seemed to him that the king, queen, and other princes, ought to act according to his will; and for certain, such was the state of affairs that nothing was refused him, but the whole court behaved courteously toward him, to appease his anger.

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"O government of France! if thou wilt suffer such things to pass with impunity, thou wilt soon have cause for lamentations. Our adversary next caused all the barricadoes and defences round the king's palace to be taken away, that his wicked intentions, already begun, might be completed. Such deeds are strong proofs of subjects having evil designs against

their king. It behoved him to have come to humble himself and seek for pardon; but, on the contrary, he came with his sword drawn, and accompanied by a numerous body of menat-arms, the greater part of whom were foreigners.-During his residence in Paris, he frequently excited to rebellion the simple inhabitants, by spreading abroad his defamatory libels, and various false promises. The citizens, believing he was to do wonders, and to be the regent of the kingdom, have been so much deceived by him that they paid great honour to him and to his writings, even by cries of joy, and shoutings of the populace whenever he appeared; by which and other like means, his pride and cruelty are increased, and make him obstinately persist in his iniquities.

"Alas! my lord king, is it not the very height of presumption to ride through Paris openly armed, after having committed such a crime, and to attend thy peaceful council with his battle-axes and lances? where thou oughtest not to have suffered any one to have entered more armed than thyself, lest the devil, who had instigated him to commit the base act he did, should unfortunately have urged him to commit a still greater, because the princes of the council did not approve of the wickedness he had done. Therefore thou shouldest never allow any one culpable like him, who takes the law into his own hands, to be in thy presence, more strongly armed than thou art thyself; for it is possible for such as he to beguile the people by the means before mentioned, and to lead them to thy own destruction as well as that of thy realm. Be pleased, therefore, to humiliate our opponent, and show thyself an upright and fearless judge in the cause of truth, that it may be said of thee as it is written in the 8th chapter of the 3d book of Kings,— Judicabit servos suos, justificans quod justum est, attribuens eis secundum justitiam.' He will judge his servants, justifying them that are upright, and giving to each according to his deserts. From this, as well as from the preceding arguments, it plainly appears, that thou art bounden to do the justice required by my lady of Orleans.

"I shall now demonstrate the crime of our adversary, and how he perpetrated such an unpardonable deed; to which I shall add six arguments to prove the fealty and loyalty of my lord of Orleans, taking for my theme the words of the advocate of our opponent,-namely, Radix omnium malorum cupiditas.' It seems to me, that covetousness has been the original cause of this murder,-not covetousness of wealth alone, but likewise covetousness of honours and ambition.-Covetousness has then been the original cause, as shall more plainly be shown hereafter.

"To prove the greatness and abomination of this crime, I shall use six arguments. The first is founded on our adversary having not the power or authority of a judge over the deceased. Secondly, Supposing he may have had any authority over him, he proceeded in his own way, contrary to every maxim of law and of justice. My third argument is grounded on the strict alliance that had been formed between my late lord of Orleans and our adversary. Fourthly, That this is a damnable murder, and cannot any way be defended or explained. Fifthly, That our opponent caused my lord of Orleans to be slain with a wicked intention. Sixthly, That, not satisfied with having caused the duke of Orleans to be deprived of his life, he has exerted himself to disgrace his fame, by defamatory libels, thus, as it were, slaying him a second time.

"As to my first argument, it plainly appears, that the malice of our adversary is incorrigible, seeing that he had not any authority over the deceased; for, according to the laws and decrees, as well as to reason and the holy Scriptures, no one can put another to death without authority from the judge or judicial. Otherwise, any one may slay another at his pleasure, and tumults and confusion would reign without any chief or head, and every one would alternately, when strongest, make himself king. So far was our adversary from having any power or authority over my lord of Orleans, that he was bound to do him honour and reverence as son to a king, and to call him his lord, and respect him in his words and actions, for such are the privileges and prerogatives belonging to the sons of kings. This nsurpation, therefore, of authority is apparent in our adversary, and consequently his wickedness has been unjustly perpetrated.

"That authority is required as essential to enable any one to put another to death, appears clearly in many parts of the holy Scriptures: and in fact, St. Austin, when

discussing the saying of our Lord, in the 26th chapter of the gospel of St. Matthew, 'Omnis qui gladium acceperit, gladio peribit; that is, Whosoever useth the sword shall perish by the sword; adds, 'All who shall, without lawful authority, make use of the sword, or shall arm himself against another, is bold in his wickedness.' He afterwards asserts, that even a malefactor cannot be put to death without lawful authority; for in his Civitas Dei, ‘Qui, inquit, sine publica administratione maleficum interfecerit, velut homicida judicabitur.' That is, Whoever shall slay a malefactor without the forms of public administration of justice, shall be judged guilty of murder. This the law confirms, Vigor, inquit, publicus tutela in medio constituta est, ne quis de aliquo, etiam sceleribus implicato sumere valeat ultionem :—which is, That the public strength is as a defence constituted and ordained to prevent any one from taking vengeance, even upon him who is involved in great and

abominable crimes.

"In truth, the advocate for our adversary may say, that the laws should only take cognizance of such as act contrary to law; and that as a tyrant proceeds directly in opposition to them, he will affirm that this murder is no way contrary to the law. Alas! and does the advocate of our opponent know that my late lord of Orleans was a tyrant? Who is the judge that declares him such? The fallacy of this assertion must be strictly examined, for on this deception is founded the supposition of my lord being a tyrant; and as our adversary groundlessly asserts, that the late duke of Orleans was a tyrant in the eye of reason, he concludes that it was lawful to put him to death. Let us, however, consider the properties of tyranny, and who should be accounted tyrants. The philosopher says, in his 4th chapter on morals, Tyrannus est, cum aliquis princeps, vi et violentia potestatis, sine titulo terram usurpat alienam, et de facto aliquam occupat civitatem vel patriam, et qui incorrigibilis est, et nulli obediens.' Now let us see whether my lord of Orleans had these properties. Certainly not; for he never took possession of another's land: if any one know the contrary, let him say so. Our opponent, therefore, ought not to have called the duke of Orleans a tyrant, for he never usurped any dominion, excepting over such places as were given him as appanages by the king, or what he had himself justly acquired. The duke of Burgundy, on the contrary, withholds three castles and their dependencies, without any just title, from the inheritance and domain of the king, namely, Lille, Douay, and Orches, notwithstanding his oaths on the holy sacrament to the king, that he would restore them to the crown, according to the conditions and agreements then made.

"My lord of Orleans was never incorrigible; for I firmly believe that never did so great a prince pay more respect and honour to the laws. Let our opponent say what acts or opposition the duke of Orleans ever committed or made against the laws. There are many noble persons now living, who can testify that no lord ever supported or maintained the dignity of justice more than the duke of Orleans during his whole life. If we consider the properties of a tyrant according to the philosophers, they declare that a tyrant bends his whole mind to slay and destroy the prudent and wise: he seeks the ruin of churches and colleges of learning, and is solely occupied with destruction. He is much to be feared for his wickedness, whilst he studies to preserve his personal safety by strong guards. Such were not the qualities of my late lord, for his were the direct opposite.

"In the first place, he never caused either wise men or fools to be put to death, but was particularly fond of the learned, and desirous of seeing any new improvements. In regard to churches, so far from destroying them, he repaired many, and founded some new ones, to which he gave large estates, as is well known. As for guarding his personal safety, he felt himself so innocent and pure toward all mankind, that he suspected no one of attempting to hurt him, and took no precautions, as you have seen, against his murderers. In fact, had he been of a suspicious temper, he would not have been thus treacherously slain. It is, therefore, wonderfully astonishing how our adversary should have dared to have called the duke of Orleans a tyrant, by way of excusing his abominable act, when it is apparent that his qualities were directly the reverse to those of a tyrant. This I think a sufficient answer to the damnable proposition of our opponent.

"But the advocate for our adversary says, That whatever he may have done contrary to the letter of the law was not, however, contrary to the intention of the maker of the law,

nor contrary to its spirit, but through love of God. Who is he that has thus revealed to him the intention of the Maker of the law, and that it is the object of laws to cause men to be put to death without authority or sentence of the law? The consequence would be, that any prince may be made away with, under pretence that he was a tyrant; for every one would interpret the law according to his fancy, which would create the greatest misfortunes. 'Cujus est leges condere ejus est interpretari.' It is therefore clear, that our opponent could not establish laws binding on the duke of Orleans, who was not his subject, or interpret the law in respect to him. For although his advocate styles him dean of the peers, it does not follow that he had any authority over the defunct; for if so, he would have authority over the whole kingdom, and be equal to the king. What though he be a peer? he has no power but over his own lands; and in so much as he attributes to himself the power of another over the realm, he appropriates to himself kingly domination.

"His advocate has indeed alleged twelve reasons to prove that his lord might lawfully put to death the duke of Orleans without orders from any one whatever. The three first are founded on the declarations of three doctors in theology, and three others on the writings of three moral philosophers,-three on the civil law, and the three last on examples drawn from the holy Scriptures.

"With regard to the first, taken from the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, who says,— 'Quando aliquis aliquod dominium sibi per violentiam suscipit nolentibus subditis, vel sine consensu communitatis et non est recursus ad superiorem per quem de tali invasore judicium posset fieri, tunc qui ad liberationem patriæ talem tyrannum occidit laudatur et præmium accipit.' To this I reply, that it is no way applicable to the case; for my lord of Orleans never intruded on any other's domination by violence, nor did he attempt to usurp the power and authority of the king. I say, he never even thought of such a thing, as will more amply be shown in the third part of my defence of him. I am therefore right in saying, that Saint Thomas speaks of him who may be proved a tyrant,—but my lord of Orleans was not one. On this subject St. Austin proposes a question,-whether it be lawful for a pilgrim to kill a robber, who is on the watch on the highway? and from his conclusion it is apparent, that he does not think it lawful for any man to put another to death without sentence of the law, as Henry de Gand afterward determined. I shall add, that supposing my lord of Orleans was such a person as our opponent describes him, but which I deny, he had a safe resort to the king, when he was in good health and cheerful with the queen and the princes of his blood,—none of whom would have hesitated to have personally exposed himself in bringing to punishment the duke of Orleans, had he been proven guilty of usurping the king's authority. Most certainly, my late lord had too good an understanding to imagine he could ever succeed to the crown, when so many obstacles were against him and the king assured of successors.

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"The second reason is founded on the authority of St. Peter, who says, 'Subditi, estote regi quasi præcellenti sive ducibus tanquam ab eo missis ad vindictam malefactorum, laudem vero bonorum, quia hæc est voluntas Dei.' These words appear to me of no weight in the present case; for it would seem that the apostle would not that any duke should have dominion over a whole kingdom, but solely in his own country: otherwise it would follow that Brittany, Berry, and the other duchies within the realm, should obey the duke of Burgundy. The advocate has, therefore, wrongfully perverted the holy Scripture to his purpose.

"His third reason is drawn from what Sabellicus says, in the fifteenth chapter of his third book, ‘Tyranno licet adulari quem licet occidere.' That is to say, It is lawful to flatter and deceive a tyrant who may legally be put to death; but Sabellicus here speaks of such as have been proven and known for tyrants. The fourth reason is founded on what Aristotle says, in his book on the government of cities, That it is lawful, and even praiseworthy, to slay a tyrant. But Aristotle alludes to a public tyrant; and such was not my lord of Orleans, as I have before shown. The fifth reason is grounded on the praise, Tully, in his book 'de Officiis,' gives to those who killed Cæsar. To this I reply, that although Tully was a man of great ability, he here speaks as an ill-wisher to Cæsar; for he was always of the party, and supported the cause of, Pompey the rival and adversary to Cæsar,-and Cæsar

perpetrated many deeds which my lord of Orleans never thought of. The sixth reason is grounded on what is said in the sixth chapter of the second book of the Misfortunes of great Men: Res est valde meritoria occidere tyrannum.' To this I answer, That it must apply only in cases where no other remedy can be had; and the conduct of our opponent has been illegal and wicked.

"The seventh and two following reasons are founded on the civil laws, which declare there are three sorts of men who may lawfully be put to death,—namely, such as disgrace their knighthood, highway robbers, and housebreakers found during the night within any dwelling. Now my lord of Orleans cannot be included with any one of the above three classes. He was ever attended by a noble body of chivalry, and was fond of it beyond measure. And in regard to the two other cases, I maintain that the law does not command such to be slain except when the danger is most inevitable. They can in no wise be applicable to my lord of Orleans, who, thank God, was no waylayer on the high roads, nor a housebreaker; and there is no law in the world that can excuse our adversary.

"The example of Moses, who slew an Egyptian without any authority, is produced to support the tenth reason. To this I say, according to the opinion of St. Austin and many other doctors, that Moses sinned in killing the Egyptian; and although Moses and St. Peter both acted contrary to the rules of justice, their cases are not similar,-for Moses was a Hebrew, and noticing an unbeliever moving towards his brother, to slay him, put him to death to prevent him from so doing. The eleventh reason is grounded on the instance of Phineas, who slew Zambre without orders, and not only remained unpunished, but was remunerated for it. Thomas Aquinas says, in exculpation of this act, that he did it as a teacher of the law, for he was the son of the high-priest, and, on this account, had power and public authority. This is also inapplicable to the question before us, as history will show.

"The twelfth reason is founded on Saint Michael having slain Lucifer without the Divine command. For this he was rewarded with riches and power, as our opponent says. To this I reply, That St. Michael did not slay Lucifer, and the assertion that he did so is deserving only of derision; for the slaying of Lucifer is nothing more than the deprivation of the Divine grace, and of the sovereign glory of paradise, whence he was cast out by God for his inordinate pride. O, my lords! in what book has this advocate learned such theology? I am confounded at the boldness of his assertions, for there is not certainly any book in which it can be found. On the contrary, we see in the epistle of St. Jude, that St. Michael dared not to rail against Lucifer, although he had power over him, nor command him to do anything; but he only said, 'Our Lord commands thee;' and thus it clearly appears, that the arguments which our adversary has produced are no way applicable to his case, nor can they serve to justify his disloyal and treacherous act.

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I repeat, that such murders as the above, which our opponent has brought forward, are not of any consequence as examples; for many things have been suffered, that are mentioned in the Old Testament, which are now forbidden. As for instance, Samuel, as a churchman, put to death the king Amalech,—but at this day it is not lawful for a churchman to commit such crimes. To Moses was given the power of repudiation from the marriage-vow, which is now forbidden. The doctrine, therefore, which is here attempted, and the examples quoted to palliate and even justify this atrocious crime, cannot be supported; and truly princes would be in constant dread of death, if this deed go unpunished, for should any evil report be spread abroad of them, some one of their subjects might take it into his head to punish them himself for it.

"O princes! consider well, that if such doctrines are supported, any man may say, 'I also may kill him as such a one did.' You will therefore be pleased to condemn this false doctrine as dangerous, seditious, and abominable. Our adversary, and all those of his party, may then say with Jeremiah, in his twentieth chapter, Confundantur vehementer qui non intellexerunt opprobrium sempiternum quod nunquam delebitur.'

"The second argument is founded upon this consideration, that the cruel death of the duke of Orleans was not accomplished according to the way of justice; and supposing our adversary had the right to inflict it, he was, notwithstanding, bound to do so according to