discussing the saying of our Lord, in the 26th chapter of the gospel of St. Matthew, “Omnie qui gladium acceperit, gladio peribit; that is, Whosoever useth the sword shall perish by the sword; adds, “All who shall, without lawful authority, make use of the sword, or shall arm himself against another, is bold in his wickedness.’ He afterwards asserts, that even a malefactor cannot be put to death without lawful authority; for in his Civitas Dei, “Qui, inquit, sine publica administratione maleficum interfecerit, velut homicida judicabitur.’ That is, Whoever shall slay a malefactor without the forms of public administration of justice, shall be judged guilty of murder. This the law confirms, ‘Vigor, inquit, publicus tutela in medio constituta est, ne quis de aliquo, etiam sceleribus implicato sumere valeat ultionem :'—which is, That the public strength is as a defence constituted and ordained to prevent any one from taking vengeance, even upon him who is involved in great and abominable crimes. “In truth, the advocate for our adversary may say, that the laws should only take cognizance of such as act contrary to law; and that as a tyrant proceeds directly in opposition to them, he will affirm that this murder is no way contrary to the law. Alas! and does the advocate of our opponent know that my late lord of Orleans was a tyrant 2 Who is the judge that declares him such The fallacy of this assertion must be strictly examined, for on this deception is founded the supposition of my lord being a tyrant; and as our adversary groundlessly asserts, that the late duke of Orleans was a tyrant in the eye of reason, he concludes that it was lawful to put him to death. Let us, however, consider the properties of tyranny, and who should be accounted tyrants. The philosopher says, in his 4th chapter on morals, “Tyrannus est, cum aliquis princeps, vi et violentia potestatis, sine titulo terram usurpat alienam, et de facto aliquam occupat civitatem vel patriam, et qui incorrigibilis est, et nulli obediens.' Now let us see whether my lord of Orleans had these properties. Certainly not ; for he never took possession of another's land : if any one know the contrary, let him say so. Our opponent, therefore, ought not to have called the duke of Orleans a tyrant, for he never usurped any dominion, excepting over such places as were given him as appanages by the king, or what he had himself justly acquired. The duke of Burgundy, on the contrary, withholds three castles and their dependencies, without any just title, from the inheritance and domain of the king, namely, Lille, Douay, and Orches, notwithstanding his oaths on the holy sacrament to the king, that he would restore them to the crown, according to the conditions and agreements then made. “My lord of Orleans was never incorrigible; for I firmly believe that never did so great a prince pay more respect and honour to the laws. Let our opponent say what acts or opposition the duke of Orleans ever committed or made against the laws. There are many noble persons now living, who can testify that no lord ever supported or maintained the dignity of justice more than the duke of Orleans during his whole life. If we consider the properties of a tyrant according to the philosophers, they declare that a tyrant bends his whole mind to slay and destroy the prudent and wise: he seeks the ruin of churches and colleges of learning, and is solely occupied with destruction. He is much to be feared for his wickedness, whilst he studies to preserve his personal safety by strong guards. Such were not the qualities of my late lord, for his were the direct opposite. “In the first place, he never caused either wise men or fools to be put to death, but was particularly fond of the learned, and desirous of seeing any new improvements. In regard to churches, so far from destroying them, he repaired many, and founded some new ones, to which he gave large estates, as is well known. As for guarding his personal safety, he felt himself so innocent and pure toward all mankind, that he suspected no one of attempting to hurt him, and took no precautions, as you have seen, against his murderers. In fact, had he been of a suspicious temper, he would not have been thus treacherously slain. It is, therefore, wonderfully astonishing how our adversary should have dared to have called the duke of Orleans a tyrant, by way of excusing his abominable act, when it is apparent that his qualities were directly the reverse to those of a tyrant. This I think a sufficient answer to the damnable proposition of our opponent. “But the advocate for our adversary says, That whatever he may have done contrary to she letter of the law was not, however, contrary to the intention of the maker of the law. nor contrary to its spirit, but through love of God. Who is he that has thus revealed to him the intention of the Maker of the law, and that it is the object of laws to cause men to be put to death without authority or sentence of the law The consequence would be, that any prince may be made away with, under pretence that he was a tyrant; for every one would interpret the law according to his fancy, which would create the greatest misfortunes. “Cujus est leges condere ejus est interpretari.' It is therefore clear, that our opponent could not establish laws binding on the duke of Orleans, who was not his subject, or interpret the law in respect to him. For although his advocate styles him dean of the peers, it does not follow that he had any authority over the defunct: for if so, he would have authority over the whole kingdom, and be equal to the king. What though he be a peer he has no power but over his own lands; and in so much as he attributes to himself the power of another over the realm, he appropriates to himself kingly domination. “His advocate has indeed alleged twelve reasons to prove that his lord might lawfully put to death the duke of Orleans without orders from any one whatever. The three first are founded on the declarations of three doctors in theology, and three others on the writings of three moral philosophers, three on the civil law, and the three last on examples drawn from the holy Scriptures. “With regard to the first, taken from the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, who says, “Quando aliquis aliquod dominium sibi per violentiam suscipit molentibus subditis, vel sine consensu communitatis ct non est recursus ad superiorem per quem de tali invasore judicium posset fieri, tune qui ad liberationem patriae talem tyrannum occidit laudatur et praemium accipit.’ To this I reply, that it is no way applicable to the case; for my lord of Orleans never intruded on any other's domination by violence, nor did he attempt to usurp the power and authority of the king. I say, he never even thought of such a thing, as will more amply be shown in the third part of my defence of him. I am therefore right in saying, that Saint Thomas speaks of him who may be proved a tyrant,--but my lord of Orleans was not one. On this subject St. Austin proposes a question,-whether it be lawful for a pilgrim to kill a robber, who is on the watch on the highway? and from his conclusion it is apparent, that he does not think it lawful for any man to put another to death without sentence of the law, as Henry de Gand afterward determined. I shall add, that supposing my lord of Orleans was such a person as our opponent describes him, but which I deny, he had a safe resort to the king, when he was in good health and cheerful with the queen and the princes of his blood, none of whom would have hesitated to have personally exposed himself in bringing to punishment the duke of Orleans, had he been proven guilty of usurping the king's authority. Most certainly, my late lord had too good an understanding to imagine he could ever succeed to the crown, when so many obstacles were against him and the king assured of successors. “The second reason is founded on the authority of St. Peter, who says, “Subditi, estote regi quasi praecellenti sive ducibus tanquam ab eo missis ad vindictam malefactorum, laudem vero bonorum, quia haec est voluntas Dei.' These words appear to me of no weight in the present case; for it would seem that the apostle would not that any duke should have dominion over a whole kingdom, but solely in his own country: otherwise it would follow that Brittany, Berry, and the other duchies within the realm, should obey the duke of Burgundy.—The advocate has, therefore, wrongfully perverted the holy Scripture to his purpose. “His third reason is drawn from what Sabellicus says, in the fifteenth chapter of his third book, ‘Tyranno licet adulari quem licet occidere.' That is to say, It is lawful to flatter and deceive a tyrant who may legally be put to death; but Sabellicus here speaks of such as have been proven and known for tyrants. The fourth reason is founded on what Aristotle says, in his book on the government of cities, That it is lawful, and even praiseworthy, to slay a tyrant. But Aristotle alludes to a public tyrant; and such was not my lord of Orleans, as I have before shown. The fifth reason is grounded on the praise, Tully, in his book ‘de Officiis, gives to those who killed Caesar. To this I reply, that although Tully was a man of great ability, he here speaks as an ill-wisher to Caesar; for he was always of the party, and supported the cause of, Pompey the rival and adversary to Caesar, and Caesar perpetrated many deeds which my lord of Orleans never thought of. The sixth reason is grounded on what is said in the sixth chapter of the second book of the Misfortunes of great Men: “Res est valde meritoria occidere tyrannum. To this I answer, That it must apply only in cases where no other remedy can be had ; and the conduct of our opponent has been illegal and wicked. “The seventh and two following reasons are founded on the civil laws, which declare there are three sorts of men who may lawfully be put to death, namely, such as disgrace their knighthood, highway robbers, and housebreakers found during the night within any dwelling. Now my lord of Orleans cannot be included with any one of the above three classes. He was ever attended by a noble body of chivalry, and was fond of it beyond measure. And in regard to the two other cases, I maintain that the law does not command such to be slain except when the danger is most inevitable. They can in no wise be applicable to my lord of Orleans, who, thank God, was no waylayer on the high roads, nor a housebreaker; and there is no law in the world that can excuse our adversary. “The example of Moses, who slew an Egyptian without any authority, is produced to support the tenth reason. To this I say, according to the opinion of St. Austin and many other doctors, that Moses sinned in killing the Egyptian; and although Moses and St. Peter both acted contrary to the rules of justice, their cases are not similar, for Moses was a Hebrew, and noticing an unbeliever moving towards his brother, to slay him, put him to death to prevent him from so doing. The eleventh reason is grounded on the instance of Phineas, who slew Zambre without orders, and not only remained unpunished, but was remunerated for it. Thomas Aquinas says, in exculpation of this act, that he did it as a teacher of the law, for he was the son of the high-priest, and, on this account, had power and public authority. This is also inapplicable to the question before us, as history will show. “The twelfth reason is founded on Saint Michael having slain Lucifer without the Divine command. For this he was rewarded with riches and power, as our opponent says. To this I reply, That St. Michael did not slay Lucifer,-and the assertion that he did so is deserving only of derision; for the slaying of Lucifer is nothing more than the deprivation of the Divine grace, and of the sovereign glory of paradise, whence he was cast out by God for his inordinate pride. O, my lords ! in what book has this advocate learned such theology 7 I am confounded at the boldness of his assertions, for there is not certainly any book in which it can be found. On the contrary, we see in the epistle of St. Jude, that St. Michael dared not to rail against Lucifer, although he had power over him, nor command him to do anything; but he only said, “Our Lord commands thee; and thus it clearly appears, that the arguments which our adversary has produced are no way applicable to his case, nor can they serve to justify his disloyal and treacherous act. “I repeat, that such murders as the above, which our opponent has brought forward, are not of any consequence as examples; for many things have been suffered, that are mentioned in the Old Testament, which are now forbidden. As for instance, Samuel, as a churchman, put to death the king Amalech,--but at this day it is not lawful for a churchman to commit such crimes. To Moses was given the power of repudiation from the marriage-vow, which is now forbidden. The doctrine, therefore, which is here attempted, and the examples quoted to palliate and even justify this atrocious crime, cannot be supported; and truly princes would be in constant dread of death, if this deed go unpunished,—for should any evil report be spread abroad of them, some one of their subjects might take it into his head to punish them himself for it. “O princes! consider well, that if such doctrines are supported, any man may say, “I also may kill him as such a one did.’ You will therefore be pleased to condemn this false doctrine as dangerous, seditious, and abominable. Our adversary, and all those of his party, may then say with Jeremiah, in his twentieth chapter, ‘Confundantur vehementer quinon intellexerunt opprobrium sempiternum quod nunquam delebitur.’ “The second argument is founded upon this consideration, that the cruel death of the duke of Orleans was not accomplished according to the way of justice; and supposing our adversary had the right to inflict it, he was, notwithstanding, bound to do so according to the forms of law, by information, and on the testimony of irreproachable witnesses. But he no ways followed this course; for he first kills the duke of Orleans, and then seeks for reasons to exculpate himself for so doing. O God! what a trial, and what a judge ' ' O justice do thy duty; and what thou owest to thyself, defend thy own cause against one who seeks to reduce thee to nothing. In truth, every law ordains that causes should be first tried, and sentences examined, before they are put into execution; and to this purpose Julius Caesar, according to what Sallust relates, said, That when judges shall put men to death before they be condemned, the greatest evils may arise, and no man live in security. He brings, as an example, the Lacedemonians, who, after their victory over the Athenians, constituted thirty persons to govern the public state, who put to death numbers without any previous trial, which caused great misfortunes. The like will befal us, if such crimes are suffered to go unpunished. Sallust tells us, that when Catiline and his associates were intending to burn the city of Rome and murder its senators, Tully was then consul; but although he was fully acquainted with the plot, he did not cause one of the conspirators to be put to death until he had fully proved their guilt. Now, my lords, as I have fully and clearly proved the heinousness of the crime with which I have charged the duke of Burgundy; and as it was done contrary to all law and justice, I trust it will not remain unpunished, according to the words of our Lord by the prophet Isaiah, in his 47th chapter: “Widebitur opprobrium tuum, ultionem capiam, et non resistet milli homo." “My third argument is grounded on our adversary's having entered into the strongest possible alliance with the duke of Orleans, in the presence of many of their dependants; and a twelvemonth prior to the murder of the above duke this alliance was renewed before several prelates, nobles, clergymen, and counsellors of each side, when the two dukes swore on the crucifix, with the holy evangelists in their hands, to the due and faithful observance of it; promising, on the salvation of their souls, and by their honour, that henceforward they would be to each other as brothers and companions in arms: engaging to reveal mutually any evil designs that might be plotted or meditated against their persons or interests. They then agreed to wear each other's badge, which was done. And at the last feast at Compiègne, for the greater confirmation of the above, my lord of Orleans and our adversary made many of their knights and dependants alternately swear, that they would loyally and truly abide by and support the bonds of friendship entered into between them, through love and attachment to their persons,—and would make known to each party anything that should be imagined against their persons or estate. Moreover, my lord of Orleans and our adversary entered into other private engagements, promising and swearing on the true cross, that they would mutually defend and guard each other's person and honour against all who should attack them. This agreement was signed with their own hands and seals. “What now, O duke of Burgundy canst thou say to these things? Who now can put any confidence in thee? for thou canst not deny the above alliance, as there are many witnesses to it now living : thou hast been publicly seen by the wholo city wearing the badge of the duke of Orleans. How did my late lord act Certainly in no way hurtful to our opponent; for from that time no reproachful or angry words passed between them, that could anyhow be ill interpreted. It is plain, therefore, that our adversary has wickedly and treacherously put to death him who had the fullest confidence in his honour. O duke what reply canst thou make to this? Shouldst thou say, that thou didst cause him to be put to death on account of the wickedness which thou hast by thy command caused to be imputed to him, say, then, why thou enteredst into any alliance or bonds of friendship with such an infamous traitor as thou hast had him painted. Thou knowest, that loyal men will never form a friendship with traitors. Thou sayest, that the duke of Orleans was a traitor to his king: thou therefore makest thyself a traitor by the act of forming an alliance with him. “Thou hast accused my lord of Orleans of having made an alliance with Henry of Lancaster: what wilt thou say to the alliances thou thyself afterward enteredst into with the duke of Orleans? If these things had happened after thy alliance with my late lord, thou wouldst have had some colour to have broken with him, although even this would have been barely sufficient; but thou knowest well that thou hast not alleged anything against him, in thy scandalous libel, posterior to these alliances. O abominable treason what can be offered in thy excuse? O ye knights, who consider honour as your judge; God will nevel suffer you to approve of such deeds. “O duke of Burgundy thou hast frequently visited the duke of Orleans, when alive: thou hast eaten and drunk with him: thou hast even taken spices out of the same dish with him, in token of friendship. In short, on the Tuesday preceding his death, he most kindly invited thee to dine with him the Sunday following, which thou promisedst to do in the presence of my lord of Berry, now here. Assuredly my lord of Orleans might have quoted the words of Jesus CHRIST to the traitor Judas, “Qui mittit manum mecum in paropside, hic me tradet.' O my lords! weigh well this treason, and apply a remedy to it. Consider how strongly the faith and loyalty of chivalry should be guarded, and the words of Vegetius, when speaking of chivalry, ‘Milites jurata sua omnia custodiant.' To the observance of this, all princes are bound,-for he who shall disgrace his loyalty or honour is unworthy of being called a knight. “My fourth argument is founded on this consideration, that the death of my late lord, the duke of Orleans, was damnable and disloyal,—and any one who should maintain or assert the contrary would not be a good Christian. We see that the secular justice allows to malefactors time for repentance,—but thou, cruel adversary! thou hast caused my lord so suddenly to be put to death that, inasmuch as in thee lay, he died without repenting of his sins. It seems, therefore, that thou hast exerted all thy influence to procure the eternal damnation of his soul when thou destroyedst his body; and most assuredly thou wilt find great difficulty to make thy peace with God,—for insomuch as thou believest him the greater sinner, so much the more need had he, as thou mayst suppose, of a fuller and longer repentance.—It follows, then, that thou hast deprived him, to the utmost of thy power, of any possibility of repentance—and consequently thy sin becomes the more grievous and inexcusable, more especially as my lord was no way expecting to die when he was thus suddenly and cruelly cut off-Nevertheless, I trust that our Lord may have granted that he died in his grace; and I the more readily believe it, inasmuch as, a short time before this sad event, he had most devoutly confessed himself. I repeat, that it is the deed of a wicked Christian thus to put a man to death ; and whoever may say the contrary, or maintain that it is meritorious, I tell him, that he speaks wickedly and erroneously, according to the theologians. “I lear, my lords, and consider the conduct of our adversary after the death of the duke of Orleans,—how on the Thursday following his murder, clothed in black, and with tears and every sign of grief, he accompanied the dead body from the church of the Guillemins to that of the Celestins! Weigh well, my lords, this treachery and dissimulation 1 O Lord God. what tears and groans !!! O Earth ! how couldst thou bear such wickedness? Open thy mouth, and swallow up all who commit such dreadful sins. Recollect, that on the ensuing Friday, at the hotel of the duke of Berry, in his presence and in that of the king of Sicily, our adversary advanced towards the servants of the late duke of Orleans, entreating them to make every inquiry after the author of this murder, and begging them to recommend him to the duchess of Orleans and to her children: then the three noble persons having conferred together, the duke of Berry declared the request was proper, and that they would exert themselves as much as possible to discover the person who had committed this atrocious act. “O duke of Burgundy thou promisedst to do this, by the mouth of my lord of Berry, whereas thou didst the worst thou could; for, not satisfied with having caused the murder of his body, thou seekest to destroy the reputation of the defunct. Thou promisedst to seek most diligently after the murderer, while thou knewest it was thyself that wast the criminal, Now, my lords, consider well, that after a resolution had been taken to seek after the author of this crime, our adversary, the duke of Burgundy, conscious of his guilt, confessed that it was he who had caused the death of the duke of Orleans. When he made this confession on his knees to the king and my lord the duke of Berry, he affirmed, that what he had done was by the instigation of the devil; and certainly in this instance he spoke the truth, for he was urged to it by jealousy and ambition. O my lords! weigh well this confession, and liow our adversary contradicts himself—for when he first comfessed his guilt, he said he had been instigated to it by the devil; but afterward he commands it to be argued, that he

« 前へ次へ »