 | Gustav Hartenstein - 1870 - 560 ページ
...so bring its ideas together, äs by their immediate comparison and äs it were juxtaposition . . • to perceive their agreement or disagreement, it is fain by the Intervention of other ideas to discover the agreement and disagreement, which it searches; and Ms is that which me call reasoning.... | |
 | Edward John Hamilton - 1883 - 738 ページ
...without which we cannot attain knowledge and certainty In this case, then, when the mind cannot so bring its ideas together, as by their immediate comparison,...discover the agreement or disagreement which it searches. Thus the mind, oeing willing to know the agreement or disagreement in bigness between the three angles... | |
 | Thomas Case - 1888 - 442 ページ
...others : and this, I think, we may call intuitive knowledge! 2 He adds that ' when the mind cannot so bring its ideas together, as by their immediate comparison,...agreement or disagreement, which it searches : and this is what we call Reasoning' 3 Afterwards, he writes a whole chapter 4 on Keason, in which he again defines... | |
 | John Locke - 1892 - 574 ページ
...made, cannot by the mind be so put together as to show it. In this case, then, when the mind cannot so bring its ideas together as by their immediate comparison,...disagreement, it is fain, by the intervention of other idens (one or more, as it happens) to discover the agreement or disagreement which it searches ; and... | |
 | Mary Whiton Calkins - 1901 - 570 ページ
...suggested. John Locke has well set forth this function of reasoning. " When the mind," he says, " cannot so bring its ideas together as by their immediate comparison,...happens) to discover the agreement or disagreement for which it searches ; and this is that which we call reasoning. Thus the mind, being willing to know... | |
 | Raymond Gregory - 1919 - 112 ページ
...its ideas. This kind of perception gives the highest degree of certainty. J "When the mind can not bring its ideas together, as by their immediate comparison, and as it were juxta-position," it perceives the agreement or disagreement by "intervening" ideas, and this is reasoning. When clearly... | |
 | Dugald Stewart - 1921 - 662 ページ
...position, or application one to another, to perceive their agree" ment or disagreement, it is fain, hy the intervention of other ideas, " (one or more as it happens) to discover the agreement or disagree" ment which it searches ; and this is that which we call reasoning.'1'1* According to these... | |
 | John Locke - 1928 - 436 ページ
...made, cannot by the mind be so put together as to show it. In this case then, when the mind cannot so bring its ideas together, as by their immediate comparison, and as it were juxta -position or application one to another, to perceive their agreement or disagreement, it is fain,... | |
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In this case then, when the mind cannot so bring its ideas together, as by their immediate comparison, and as it were juxta-position or application one to another, to perceive their agreement or disagreement, it is fain, by the intervention of other ideas... 
